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Executive Summary 
Introduction: Macro background to the inequality trends in Korea, 1980-2011 
There has been a great U-turn in inequality trends over the last 3 decades in Korea, the mid-1990s 
being a turning period when the downward trend of inequality changed upward. This is related to 
the great economic, social, and political changes which happened in the mid-1990s such as the re-
establishment of diplomatic ties with China in 1992, joining the OECD in 1996, and the financial crisis 
and the change of political power in 1997. 
Since mid-1990s, the Korean economy has been fully opened to world economy, and the 
manufacturing sector continued to grow due to expanding export. Its employment share, however, 
drastically decreased resulting in jobless growth and labour market dualization. 
Going through the financial crisis calling for economic restructuring, not only potential economic 
growth rate, but also population growth rate and fertility rate have decreased, which deteriorate 
performance of labour market. Moreover, employment was the most hard-hit by the financial crisis. 
While the economy recovered its previous level very rapidly, the employment could not. Though the 
self-employed sector started to be dismantled rapidly and the ratio of wage workers has increased, 
however, the labour’s share in national account has decreased or stagnated since 1996. This may be 
due to the deterioration of jobs such as increases of non-regular and low-wage workers. The low-
performance of labour market both in quantity and quality has been the main driver of growing 
inequality in Korea.  
 
The nature of Inequality and its Development over Time 
Income Inequality  
The Gini coefficient shows that the household income inequality accelerated directly after the 1997 
financial crisis, and has gradually increased since then. The decile index also shows that the inequality 
has been growing more rapidly in the lower part of income distribution rather than in the upper part. 
The relative poverty rate leveled up after the crisis, while the absolute poverty rate came back to its’ 
pre-crisis level. 
One specific feature of the inequality of Korea is that the overall level of income inequality is about 
average of the OECD countries while the labour market income(wage) inequality is the highest in 
OECD. It might be explained by the relatively high rate of labour supply in lower income classes and 
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the role of private transfer income. The inequality mitigating effects of higher labour supply of lower 
income classes, however, has been reduced, which might be due to assortive mating, dualization of 
female labour market, and relatively higher increasing rate of female participation rate in upper part 
of spouse-income distribution. 
Decompositon of the increasing income inequality over the 15 years shows following results. First, 
the increase of income inequality within working age households explains the majority of inequality 
while the effect of the increasing proportion of elderly households is secondary. Second, the 
increasing inequality in wage earning was proven to be a major factor behind the growing inequality. 
Third, the redistribution policies such as public transfer and tax payments contributed for the 
reduction of income inequality, although the policies were not enough to overcome the rapid growth 
of market income inequality. 
 
Wealth and Debt Inequality  
Though the wealth inequality is relative low, the net worth GINI has leveled up with the financial 
crisis in 1997. The share of tangible assets, particularly house and land, are far more important than 
the financial ones in household wealth, and the larger the amount of total assets, the larger the 
relative share of tangible assets within the total assets. So, the wealth inequality became more 
unequally distributed as house price has risen. Moreover, the debt of the lowest class has risen more 
rapidly than higher classes as house price has gone down. 
 
Labour Market Inequality  
The wage inequality is higher and increasing more rapidly than the household income inequality. The 
GINI coefficients are higher in hourly wage rather than in total wage. Low wage workers compensate 
for their lower hourly pay with longer working hours. And, the GINI coefficients change little even 
when part-time workers are left out. In the wage decile ratios, the P50/P10 ratio started to increase 
from 1989 while the P90/P50 ratio started to increase from 1999. This implies that the relative wage 
growth rate of low wage workers has been low since 1989. Of course it has been much lower since 
1999 after the financial crisis. On the contrary, the relative wage growth of the middle wage group 
has been higher for 1981-1997, but lower than those of high wage group for 1998-2007. It can be 
said that the middle wage group was more hard-hit by the crisis and the overall wage disparities 
between wage-groups have been enlarged since the crisis. 
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The wage premium for higher education also began to increase at the same time when the entrance 
rate to tertiary education started to increase in 1993, which means that there could have been skill-
biased technological changes in Korea as well. However, there are many studies which show that the 
changing trade structure was a main driver inducing larger demand for skilled workforce and 
reducing demand for lower-skilled one. Although Korea has been very fast in investment and 
consumption of information technology, the increase of trade intensity and the changes of trade 
structure from the US to China were faster. 
The growing educational wage inequality, however, cannot be fully explained by labour demand and 
supply. The labour market institution is also an important factor in the growing inequality. Even 
within the same educational group, the inequality has been increasing, but within the same 
establishment size, it has not. Establishment size, tenure(job stability), employment types, which are 
variables related to labour institutions, were also important in worsening wage inequality. This 
means that extending educational opportunities is not enough and changes in economic and 
industrial structure and the labour market institutions are important to reduce overall wage 
inequality in Korea. 
The inequality among self-employees is higher than that among wage earners as well. The total GINI 
coefficient increases by 3.5-7.5% when self-employees are included in the workforce. The effects of 
including self-employment on income inequality, however, may not be so great considering the 
decreasing share of self-employment in the workforce. 
The stagnating employment performance after the financial crisis of 1997 would have made earning 
inequality of the entire working-age population higher than earnings inequality among workers. Also, 
the employment accessibility of lower educated persons has been lowered since 1999, particularly in 
male labor force, which means that the inequality mitigating effects of relatively higher accessibility 
to the labor market of low skilled workers have been reduced. 
 
Educational Inequality  
Korea has been successful in obtaining so-called ‘shared growth’(growth without inequality) for the 
three decades since 1960s by extending opportunities of education for all. Even after the 1980s, the 
educational opportunities had been still extended. The average education years was only 7.6 in 1980, 
9.5 in 1990, it is now 11.6 in 2010. It is 14.1 for the age group of 20∼29, which might be one of the 
world’s highest educational attainment levels.  
During the past five decades, the growing educational attainment years have caused more equal 
distribution of education level in the labor force. The GINI coefficient of educational attainment years 
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was 22.1 in 1994, and then 18.5 in 2010. Meanwhile, the entrance rate to tertiary education began to 
increase since the 1990s. It was 34.3% in 1992 to 83.8% in 2008. Since 2009, the female entrance 
rate took over that of the males.  
Even though educational opportunity in terms of quantity has been extended for all for a long time, 
the differential of educational expenditure by the income has also been enlarged since 1993 when 
the entrance rate to tertiary education started to increase. The differential of educational 
expenditure together with growing educational wage inequality has worked as a factor aggravating 
inequality by increasing differentials of educational quality. 
 
Limits in Data Availability 
One caveat in interpreting the inequality is that the available data might underestimate the reality of 
inequality in Korea. The long-term trends of Gini are calculated only based on the survey data for 
urban household with 2 or more excluding single household and rural household. The wage 
inequality is only for regular employees in establishments with 10 or more as well. The Gini from the 
National Tax Service data 0.503 compared to the Gini from the Basic Wage Survey, 0.373 in 2011. The 
income share of top 1% is 7-8% from the survey data, but it is more than 16% in the National Tax 
Service data. The survey data cannot fully grasp asset and top incomes. The real inequality might be 
higher and worsening faster than the data tells. 
 
The Social Impacts of Inequality 
The growing inequality since late 1990s has strong correlations with increasing credit defaulters, 
poverty, crime rate, suicide rate, family breakdown, divorce rate, and marriage rate, income mobility, 
mobility by generations even though it is not easy to find evidences of their causations. 
The share of personal credit defaulters, as a proxy variable for material deprivation went hand in 
hand with growing inequality, and crime, suicide, and marriage rate appear to have high correlations 
with growing inequality. Family breakdown such as increasing single-parent family and divorce rate 
and decreasing marriage rate also has high correlations with the growing inequality. 
The subtle change of housing tenure practice is significant to residential inequality in Korea. With 
lowering interest rates, many house owners converted Jeonse, a unique Korean housing practice to 
monthly rent, which causes financial burden to house renters who cannot usually afford to own a 
house. This may strengthen the already-existing residence-related inequality. 
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As inequality grows, poverty persistency has been raised and income mobility and mobility by 
generation have decreased. Social mobility in both intra-generational and inter-generational terms 
has been decreased in the recent two decades. Korean society had been characterized by active 
social mobility in the age of rapid industrialization, but the poverty persistence and slowdown of 
income mobility suggest that chances of status advancement were reduced gradually. The reduction 
of intergenerational mobility poses a more serious problem. Socioeconomic status of one’s parents is 
inherited from generation to generation by the mediating effects of private tutoring. Korea has 
become a more and more closed and rigid society. 
 
The political and cultural impacts 
With the growing inequality, political and cultural life in Korea has changed since 2000s. Tendencies 
to decline in voter turnout rate and union density, low level of trust in society, pessimistic evaluation 
on income distribution have persisted throughout the 2000s as inequality has risen. 
We can point out some unique features in the development of inequality and its political and cultural 
impacts. First, although the voter turnout rate has fallen since 1987, political cynicism measured by 
nonparticipation in voting can be detected for the more educated. It refutes the common wisdom 
that the more educated, having knowledge and views on politics, have a higher propensity to vote.  
Second, despite growing inequality and the low level of satisfaction with politics, the politically 
conservative climate has changed little. Growing inequality has seemingly reduced the number of 
self-reported conservatives but they have not converted to liberals but to “neither liberal nor 
conservative”. In 2010 they constitute the largest faction in the political landscape, reflecting another 
aspect of political cynicism. 
Lastly, unlike most advanced countries’, discourses on welfare state expansion is now much in vogue 
in Korea. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a result of an exhaustion of developmental 
dictatorship model which had driven Korean people to relentless economic growth without social 
policies. Growing inequality and insecurity after the economic crisis in the late 1990s must have 
contributed to upsurge of welfare demands. Korea is expected to expand social policies as long as 
inequality continues to rise. 
 
Effectiveness of Policies in Combating Inequality 
As Korea was kind of ‘developing country’ in social policies, Korea has very weak social policies before 
the crisis. However, the crisis and growing wage inequality precipitated diverse social policies. 
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Notwithstanding, their overall effects are somewhat limited at the moment. 
As labour income is the major reason of the growing income inequality and there are wide-spread 
low-wage sector, minimum wage policy is a very powerful means to combat the inequality. The 
increasing rate of minimum wage began to catch up with the average wage growth rate after the 
crisis, but the minimum wage has not been successful in raising the relative wage level of low-wage 
workers. This is because minimum-wage regulations are not strictly enforced and complied with. 
Considering the supply of low-skilled labor increases in labor market as a result of the introduction of 
EITC, minimum wage would be a more effective way of supporting the low-income families by 
preventing wage reduction of low-skilled workers if it is well enforced. 
The weak unionization for the disadvantaged and the prevalence of company-level industrial 
relations has become working as one factor of the growing inequality.  
The redistribution effect of tax and social expenditure in Korea is known to be insignificant. The 
amount of social expenditure itself as a percentage of GDP is still insufficient, although it has 
increased recently. And, public income transfer depends too much on social insurance system, which 
has lack of coverage so far. Low income populations are less likely to be covered by social insurance 
as well. The public pension scheme is not matured enough, although it is progressively designed. 
Ineffectiveness of public pension to protect the elderly results in very high rates of poverty in the 
elderly population. 
However, there is some evidence for the improvement of policy effectiveness as well. The public 
transfer and taxation worked positively to reduce income inequality, although the policies were not 
enough to overcome the rapid growth of labor income inequality. The National Basic Livelihood 
Security System (NBLSS), implemented in 2000, was effective in reducing poverty. 
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1 Introduction 
Macro background to the inequality trends in Korea, 1980-2011. 
As will be shown in the main part of this report, there has been a great U-turn in the inequality 
trends over the last 3 decades in Korea. The mid-1990s is a turning period when the downward trend 
of inequality has changed upward. 
This is related to the great economic, social, and political changes which happened in the mid-1990s 
in Korea. As Korea re-established diplomatic ties with China in 1992, joined OECD as a member 
country in 1996, and was hard-hit by the financial crisis in 1997, the Korean economy has become 
fully open to the world economy and discarded the remaining targeted industrial policies. 
Figure 1-1 shows that the ratio of foreign trade to national income has increased since 1993. As 
Korea has developed with the export-oriented economic strategy, the ratio has increased since the 
1960s. It was only over the 1980s when the ratio has decreased due to the industrial restructuring of 
the early-1980s and domestic demand led economic boom of the late-1980s. This short-term trend 
has been reversed since the 1990s. The momenta were growing economic relationship with China 
and the financial crisis. The trade volume with China has multiplied 50-fold since 1991. China’s share 
in trade volume has increased from 2.9% in 1991 to 20.4% in 2011. 
  
Figure 1.1 Macro-Trends in Trade, Industry, and Employment in Korea(1980-2010). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office.  
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from 27.6% in 1991 to 16.9% in 2011. One million jobs have disappeared over 20 years as the 
manufacturing jobs were 5.16 million in 1991 and 4.09 million in 2011. The so-called jobless growth 
has happened in the manufacturing sector, which can be seen as one reason for the worsening 
inequality trends. As the employment share of non-manufacturing increased, while its value-added 
per capita stagnated, the quality of service jobs had deteriorated and inequality increased.  
While the trade and manufacturing sector has been growing faster, the overall economic growth rate 
had been slowed down after the financial crisis. The Korean economy was one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world for more than 3 decades since the 1960s. As can be seen in [Figure 1.2], the 
GDP per capita was only 1,660 $ in 1980, but it is more than 20,000 $ in 2011. According to the Korea 
Development Institute, however, the potential economic growth rate has been decreased to 4-5% 
since the 2000s. The real economic growth rates were also around 4-5% except the turbulent periods 
of the financial crises, 1997-2000 and 2008-2010.  
 
Figure 1.2 GDP Growth Rate and GDP per Capita(1980-2010). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office.  
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is widely accepted that the decreasing fertility rate is due to higher job-related risks and the growing 
burden of living expenses (particularly housing and education). 
 
Figure 1.3 Population Growth Rate and Total Fertility Rate(1980-2010). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office.  
 
Figure 1.4 Employment Rate and Unemployment Rate (aged 15 or more). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
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As the potential of economic growth and population has been decreasing, the employment 
performance of the labor market was subpar. Employment was the most hard-hit by the financial 
crisis in 2007. While the economy recovered its previous level very rapidly, employment could not. 
Before the crisis, the employment rate increased from 53.7% in 1984 to 60.9% in 1997, and the 
unemployment rate was below 3% for 1988-1997. After the crisis, however, the employment rate 
could not go over 60.0%, and the unemployment rate is over 3%.1 
In the labor market, the self-employed sector started to be dismantled rapidly and the ratio of wage 
workers has increased since the 2000s. Labor’s share in national income, however, decreased or 
stagnated. Before the financial crisis of 1997, labor’s share and wage worker’s ratio has increased 
together at the same time. In the distribution of factor income, labor share ceased to grow after mid-
1990s. This may be due to the deterioration of jobs such as increases of non-regular workers of low-
wage workers.  
 
Figure 1.5 Labor Share and Ratio of Wage Workers (1980-2010). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office.  
 
As will be seen in the main part of the report, the entrance rate to tertiary education and the 
educational attainment of population have been dramatically increased since mid-1990s. While the 
                                                                
1 Contrary to the developed European countries, the unemployment rate is not a appropriate index to see labour  
market performance in Korea because still many people go to economic inactivities (not unemployment status) if 
he/she is put out of work.  
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quantitative expansion of education contributes to widening opportunities, the low-wage sector is 
still widespread and its working conditions are continuously deteriorating. 
In 1997, Korea experienced not only financial crisis but also for the first time a change of political 
power. Though the newly ruling democratic party and its president Kim D.J., and Roh, M.H. 
governments have established and extended the social security system. Now, Korea has been 
equipped with institutionalized social security system similar to those of developed European welfare 
states. But, inequality is still increasing. This is due to more worsening of inequality in the market and 
still insufficient provision of social security. 
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2 The Nature of Inequality and its Development over Time  
2.1  Main Features of Household Income Distribution  
2.1.1 Overall level of income inequality 
The overall level of income inequality in Korea is similar to the average of the OECD countries. The 
Gini coefficient of disposable income in 2011 was 0.311, which was slightly higher than the OECD 
average. On the other hand, market income inequality of Korean households is very low compared to 
other countries, with a 0.342 Gini coefficient in 2011. The gap between the GINI coefficients of 
market and disposable income is very narrow, which implies the limited effectiveness of the Korean 
income redistribution policies.  
The relatively low market income inequality is also a puzzle to be explained, because the distribution 
of wage and salary is widely dispersed in the Korean labor market. Why is it that while labor income 
of individuals in Korea' labor market is extremely unequal, the household market income is relatively 
equal? This is a phenomenon that occurs due to the labor supply pattern of households. If a relatively 
high number of household members from the low income brackets that lack human capital 
participate in labor supply, income measured on the household level may be found to be distributed 
equally even if the labor market is unequal. Using LIS mid-2000’s data, Chang(2012) found that while 
the number of labor income earners in the lower 20% income brackets of developed nations were 
0.3~0.7 people per household, in Korea, an average of 1.4 people per household participate in labor 
activities in that same income bracket. Based on this fact, the study suggested that while Korea has 
an extremely unequal labor market, the individual households participate more in economic 
activities, making the household income distribution relatively equal. 
 
2.1.2 Long-term Trend of income inequality 
One material appropriate for allowing a time series observation of the income inequality index is the 
Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO)'s Household Income and Expenditure Survey(HIES) in which 
total income and expenditure of each household is calculated on a monthly basis through entries in 
household ledgers. However, because the survey was extended for the entire household after 2006, 
a reliable time series analysis is only for urban households with two or more members. 
[Figure 2.1] shows changes in income distribution since the 1990s measured through the GINI 
coefficient. According to this figure, until the mid-1990s, income inequality in Korea was much lower 
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than it is today. It took a sharp increase with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, followed by some 
fluctuation, and continued to increase since the mid and late 2000s. The level of inequality in all 
households can only be observed after 2006, but it is possible to assume that even before that, 
inequality in households with two or more members would have shown a similar pattern, although 
the overall level would have been higher.  
Another notable phenomenon found in [Figure 2.1] is that the difference between market income 
and disposable income Gini is on the rise since the early 2000s. This can be interpreted that with 
social security systems having been strengthened since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, 
redistribution policies have begun to have stronger effects than they previously had. 
 
Figure 2.1 GINI Coefficient Trends: Urban 2+ HHs and Total HHs, 1990-2011. 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, Household Income and Expenditure Survey. 
 
Figure 2.2 GINI Coefficient Trends: 1982-2006, Urban 2+ HHs. 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, Household Income and Expenditure Survey. 
Note: Calculations of Dr. Roh Dae-Myung (Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs) 
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In order to find out the Gini coefficients during the period before the early and mid-1990s when 
inequality was relatively low, we added one more figure in [Figure 2.1], which provides data from 
previous years, although it encompasses only worker households in cities. According to this figure, 
income was more unequal in the 1980s than the 1990s. Income inequality is likely to have improved 
following the activation of labor movements during the labor strikes of 1987. In short, income 
inequality in Korea as observed through time series data was the lowest in the early and mid-1990s, 
and high in the periods before and after that point. The point in time when income inequality began 
to decrease corresponds to the point when wages of laborers began to rise due to the labour 
movement, and the point when income inequality began to rise again during the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997, after which the Gini coefficient continues an upward trend until the late 2000s. 
[Figure 2.2] provides P50/P10 and P90/P10 ratio of income deciles in Korea. As we can see, the 
inequality has worsened in the lower part of income distribution rather than in the upper part. And, 
the redistribution effects of social policies have been taken more in the lower part since the crisis. 
Then, one caveat is that the top income is not well represented in the survey data. While the income 
share of top 1% is 6-8% if it calculated from the National Survey of Tax and Benefit (the Korea 
Institute of Public Finance) or the Survey of Household Finance, it is more than 16% in the National 
Tax Service data(Park, 2012). This may cause P90/P50 to be underestimated. 
 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. Calculated from data on kosis.kr 
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[Figure 2.3] shows the trend of income share by high and low income groups. Again, we can observe 
the long term trends of income share only for the urban households with two or more household 
members. The share of the bottom 20 % of households was continuously decreased from 9.4% of 
total national income in 1996 to 7.6% in 2011, while the share of the upper 20 % increased during the 
same period. It is noteworthy that we can observe a steady decline of income share of the low-
income group as well as sudden drop of the share during the economic shock period. The share of 
low income group suddenly dropped during the economic shock period and it has also steadily 
decreased since then. 
 
Figure 2.4 Trends of Income Share by income quintile (unit: %). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, Household Income and Expenditure Survey, each year 
 
The change of real income in the same period tells us similar stories. [Figure 2.4] presents the change 
of real income for each income group compared with the 1990's income. While the increasing trends 
had not been quite different among the three income classes until 1997, the gap among the classes is 
getting wider in the recent decade, mostly due to the stagnating income level of the low-income 
class. 
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
6,0
6,5
7,0
7,5
8,0
8,5
9,0
9,5
10,0
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
total HHs 
Low 20% (left axis) High20% (right axis)
GINI Country Report Korea 
 
Page 17 
 
Figure 2.5 Change of Real Income by Income Quintiles. 
Notes: Disposable income is used. Middle income class includes mid 60% of households.  
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, Household Income and Expenditure Survey, each year. 
 
Another important indicator to measure income inequality is the poverty rate. The poverty rate in 
Korea is clearly higher than the OECD average, while the GINI coefficient of Korea is around OECD 
average. [Figure 2.5] shows the absolute and relative poverty ratios based on disposable income. In 
1998~1999, the period of Asian economic crisis, the absolute poverty ratio hit the peak and went 
back to previous level, while the relative poverty ratio seems to remain its high level in 2000's.  
 
Figure 2.6 Absolute and Relative Poverty Ratios based on Disposable Income. 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, Household Income and Expenditure Survey (1990 ~ 2006) 
Note 1: urban data = two or more person households which include wage and salary workers. From 2006, HIES 
provide information on the whole HHs including one-person HHs and non-wage workers HHs. 
Note 2: absolute poverty ratio = proportion of persons with equivalized HH income below the minimum cost of 
living which is measured by government every three years; relative poverty ratio = proportion of persons with 
income below 50% of equivalized HH median income. 
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The HIES provides long time series on household income but it included two or more person 
households only prior to 2006. If we calculate National Expenditure Survey(KNSO) which included the 
whole population but surveyed only a few times, we can obtain the poverty ratio for the whole 
population comparable to that of the HEIS of 2006 and later. 
 
2.1.3 Driving Forces of the Increasing Income Inequality  
What are the driving forces behind increasing inequality since the late 1990's? Four hypothetical 
factors may affect the recent trend of inequality: population ageing, change of household labor 
supply, wage dispersion, and redistribution policies. Each factor can be translated into research 
questions as follows.  
First, how much can the population ageing explain the increasing inequality since the late 1990's? 
Everything else being equal, population ageing can increase the overall income inequality at the 
current point of time in Korea, because the proportion of the poor is much higher among the Korean 
elderly. The proportion of 65 or older population has increased from 5.1% in 1990 to 11.0% in 2010. 
The relative poverty ratio of the elderly population is 47.1% in 2010.  
Second, how strongly does the pattern of female labor supply affect the household income inequality 
of working age population? Household income inequality is largely affected by two highly correlated 
factors, household labor supply and wage dispersion in the labor market. The increasing number of 
one-person households and one-parent families tends to make HH income inequality increased. 
Among couple families, female labor force participation rates may affect inequality.  
It is also useful to observe which income classes the female participants belong to. According to 
Maxwell(1990), who analyzed the CPS data from 1947 to 1985, wives of low income husbands 
tended to participate to the labor market with a higher rate than their high income counterparts in 
the 1950's and 1960's, which means that wives’ labor supply reduced the HH income inequality in 
this period of time in the United States. Since participation rates of middle income earners' wives had 
increased in 1970's, the positive effects of female labor supply on HH income equality were 
diminishing. Lee(2008) reports similar stories in the Korean case. He observed enlarged inequality of 
household income in Korea between 1996 and 2000 and he argued that the most important driving 
factor was the increasing dispersion of household heads' labor income and that the change of 
spouses' labor supply contributed to lessen the inequality of household income. On the contrary, Kim 
and Shin(2008) shows that the female labour participation rates have increased for 2-8 deciles of 
spouse’s income rather 9-10 deciles and that the increase does not contribute to reducing household 
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income inequality due to increase in assortive mating and female labour market dualization during 
1998-2005. 
Third, how much does the wage dispersion explain household income inequality while the labor 
income composes 3/4 of total household income in average in OECD countries (OECD, 2011)? Very 
high rates of low wage employment and non-regular employment might be the most important 
factors affecting HH income inequality in Korea, as Lee(2008) observed for the late 1990's.  
Fourth, how much does taxation and public income transfer affect work to reduce the disposable 
income inequality? Social assistance, unemployment payment, and old-age pension systems have 
been developed during the past several decades in Korea, and we need to ask whether those 
institutions contributed to attenuate the income inequality. 
 
Decomposition by Household Type:  
In order to investigate whether the increasing income inequality originates in population ageing in 
Korea, we decompose the change of inequality by household type that is identified as working age 
(18~64 years old) households and elderly households according to their household heads' ages. The 
measurement of income inequality used in this chapter is Mean Log Deviation (MLD) defined in the 
following formula. If the incomes are equally distributed, MLD would be zero.  
, 
Where  is mean income of the population,  is the income of household , and  is the number 
of individuals. 
Considering the types of households, the total inequality can be decomposed according to the 
following formula (Static Decomposition).  
, 
where  is the component proportion ratio of members of specific household type ( ) among total 
population, and  is the inequality measure by household type. The first part of the right-hand 
side of formula is the within-group component of the inequality and the second part is the between-
group component of the inequality. 
[Table 2.1] shows the results of the decomposition. MLD in 2011 increased to 0.245 from 0.145 in 
1996. The structure of the population has also been changed and the members of elderly households 
increased. The income inequality was increased in both household types, and that of elderly 
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households were severe. The within-group component occupies the most part of the inequality in 
both years. Although the contribution of elderly households to the total inequality increased from 8.7% 
in 1996 to 25.7% in 2011, the contribution of working age household population was the majority 
(68.8%) in 2011. 
 
Table 2.1 Decomposition of Income Inequality by Household Type. 
(unit: Korean Thousand Won, %) proportion 
mean yearly 
income 
MLD 
absolute 
contribution 
relative 
contribution 
1996 
elderly HHs 3.5 12,404 0.36487 0.01262 (8.7) 
working age HHs 96.5 20,583 0.13283 0.12824 (88.7) 
within group inequality    0.14086 (97.5) 
between group 
inequality 
   0.00368 (2.5) 
total   0.14454 0.14454 (100.0) 
       
2011 
elderly HHs 11.9 12,994 0.53039 0.06306 (25.7) 
working age HHs 88.1 22,363 0.19129 0.16854 (68.8) 
within group inequality    0.23161 (94.5) 
      
between group 
inequality 
   0.01346 (5.5) 
total   0.24507 0.24507 (100.0) 
Note: 1) Yearly incomes are deflated by 2010 CPI. 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, HES 1996, HIES 2011. 
 
The change of income inequality as time elapses can be decomposed as follows (Oxley et al., 1997). 
, 
The first part of the right-hand side of the formula is the change of the within-group inequality while 
GINI Country Report Korea 
 
Page 21 
the proportion of each household type is fixed, and the second part is the change of the between-
group inequality while the proportion of each household type is fixed. The remaining three parts are 
the change of inequality due to the compositional change of each household type while the within-
group and the between-group components are fixed.  
<Table 2.2> presents the decomposition of inequality change between 1996 and 2011. The increase 
of within-group inequality contributed as much as 66.3% to the total increase of inequality, and the 
change of population composition by household type explains 31.6% of inequality change between 
those two years. Among the effect of within-group inequality, the increase of income inequality 
within working age households explains the majority of inequality (53.7%). In sum, the increase of 
income inequality within the working age population was the most important factor and the 
proportional change of elderly households was the second most important factor in explaining the 
increasing inequality during the last 15 years of the period. 
 
Decomposition of Income Inequality by Income Sources 
In order to identify the effects of each income sources on inequality, we apply the method of GINI 
coefficient decomposition developed by Shorrocks(1982), and Lerman and Yitzhaki(1985). The 
GINIcoefficient(  ) can identified in terms of income by sources(  ) as follows.  
, 
Table 2.2 Decomposition of Change of Income Inequality by Household Type (1996~2011). 
 
total net effect of within-group inequality 
net effect of 
between 
-group 
inequality  
composition effect 
total elderly HH working age HH sub-total 
net effect of 
between 
-group 
inequality  
composition effect 
absolute 
contribution 0.10053  0.01270  0.05397  0.06667  0.00205  0.03181  
relative 
contribution 100.0  12.6 53.7 66.3  2.0  31.6  
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. HES 1996, HIES 2011. 
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where is the covariance between income source  and the cumulative distribution of total 
income , and  is the mean of total income. It is possible to decompose the effects of each 
income source by multiplying by and dividing by .  
, 
where is GINI correlation between income source  and the cumulative distribution of total 
income, and  is the GINI coefficient of income source ,  is 's proportion in total income. 
The absolute contribution of income , and, . The relative contribution of 
, the percentage of the contribution of each income source is , and . Dividing 
the relative contribution by the proportion of each income source, gives us the relative income 
inequality (  ). If the relative income inequality of an income source is greater than 1, then its 
contribution can be regarded greater than the proportion of the source. And with income change 
 in a certain source , the relative marginal effect of the source can be expressed as 
. The sum of the relative marginal effects is 0. 
[Table 2.3] shows the result of decomposition of inequality by income sources such as employment 
and business income, capital income, and public and private transfer. The GINI coefficient of 
disposable income increased from 0.275 in 1996 to 0.302 in 2011. The GINI coefficients of 
employment, business, and capital income increased while those of public and private transfers and 
tax contributions decreased between 1996 and 2011. The proportions of employment income, public 
transfer, and tax contribution increased, while the proportion of business income decreased.  
The relative contribution of employment income to the total inequality was dramatically increased 
from 0.474 in 1996 to 0.848 in 2011, while the contribution of business income was reduced from 
0.486 to 0.245. The inequality of employment income can be understood as a major factor of the 
total income inequality in recent years. The contributions of public transfer seem to be insignificant 
in those two years, while tax and social security contribution works for income redistribution. 
The relative inequality and the relative marginal effects show the magnitude of the income sources’ 
effect on the total income inequality while controlling for their proportions. In 2011, the relative 
marginal effect was greatest in employment income where 1% of employment income increase 
accompanies 0.102% of inequality of total income. The redistribution effects of public transfer and 
tax payment was 0.043% and 0.021% each. 
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Table 2.3 Decomposition of Income Inequality by Income Sources. 
 
income source GINI Proportion GINI corr. 
Absolute 
contribution 
Relative 
contribution 
Relative 
Inequality 
Relative 
Marginal 
Effect  
  
G S R C I I/S I-S 
1996 total 0.275  1.000  1.000  0.275  1.000  1.000  0.000  
 
employment 0.465  0.631  0.444  0.130  0.474  0.751  -0.157  
 
business 0.769  0.321  0.541  0.134  0.486  1.515  0.165  
 
capital 0.906  0.048  0.478  0.021  0.076  1.575  0.028  
 
private transfer 0.925  0.037  -0.014  0.000  -0.002  -0.047  -0.039  
 
public transfer 0.988  0.007  0.180  0.001  0.005  0.648  -0.003  
 
tax & social 
security 
contribution 
-0.586  -0.045  -0.409  -0.011  -0.039  0.871  0.006  
2011 total 0.302  1.000  1.000  0.302  1.000  1.000  0.000  
 
employment 0.491  0.745  0.701  0.256  0.848  1.137  0.102  
 
business 0.781  0.250  0.380  0.074  0.245  0.981  -0.005  
 
capital 0.976  0.005  0.325  0.001  0.005  1.050  0.000  
 
private transfer 0.919  0.050  0.110  0.005  0.017  0.335  -0.033  
 
public transfer 0.851  0.045  0.012  0.000  0.002  0.034  -0.043  
 
tax & social 
security 
contribution 
-0.477  -0.095  -0.775  -0.035  -0.116  1.224  -0.021  
Source:Korea National Statistical Office, HES 1996, HIES 2011. 
 
How much did each income source contribute the change of income inequality between 1996 and 
2011? Förster(2000) provides a method to decompose the change of absolute contribution of each 
source (  ) into parts due to change of inequality of each source and parts due to change of 
proportion of each sources in total income. The income source 's absolute contribution to GINI 
coefficient can be expressed as a product of the proportion of each income source(  ) and the 
relative inequality with its controlling proportion(  ).  
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Now, the change of income source 's contribution consists of the component due to the change of 
inequality of each source (  ) and the component due to the change of the 
proportion(  ).  
, 
where . 
[Table 2.4] shows the result of static decomposition of income inequality. The GINI coefficient of 
disposable income increased from 0.275 in 1996 to 0.302 in 2011. Although the change of proportion 
of each income source works to reduce the inequality, the contribution of the growing inequality of 
each income source prevailed over the effect of proportional change. In particular, the increasing 
inequality in employment income was proven to be a major factor of growing inequality.  
 
Table 2.4 Decomposition of Change of Income Inequality by Income Sources (1996 ~ 2011). 
 
employ- 
ment 
business capital 
private 
transfer 
public 
transfer 
tax&SScont. total 
change of absolute 
contribution 
0.126  -0.060  -0.019  0.006  -0.001  -0.024  0.027  
change of proportion 0.031  -0.025  -0.016  0.001  0.004  -0.015  -0.021  
change of ineq. of source  0.095  -0.034  -0.003  0.005  -0.004  -0.009  0.049  
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, HES 1996, HIES 2011. 
 
Effects of Household Labor Supply and Wage Dispersion on Inequality 
We found the growing inequality of employment income a critical factor behind overall income 
inequality. Then what makes the inequality of employment income higher? Now we try to identify 
the effects of labor supply of household heads and spouses, and the effects of family structure as 
well as those of wages and salaries of working individuals. Two frequently asked research questions 
are closely related with this analysis. First is whether spouse's, particularly female spouse's additional 
labor supply affect positively or negatively on inequality. Second, how do the increasing one-person 
households and single-parent families affect income inequality?  
Here, again we focus on the working age population, excluding households headed by elderly people. 
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Inequality is measured by mean income difference between the first and tenth decile of disposable 
income. Following Lee (2005), we identify mean household income in a specific income decile as 
follows. 
, 
where subscript  indicates the household head,  is labor income(employment and business 
income), P is the employment rate,  is the proportion of households whose head and spouse live 
together.  stands for other household members’ income, capital income, private and public 
income transfer, and tax and social security contribution combined. The inequality measure,  is 
defined as the log difference between the mean incomes of the highest 10% and lowest 10% 
households. 
where  is highest 10% and  is lowest 10%. 
The inequality measure is approximately expressed as follows. 
 
where  is the proportion of each income source. For example,  is the proportion 
of the spouse' labor income in the total household income. 
The change of inequality between two time points can be decomposed as follows. 
 
The first part of the right-hand side of the formula stands for the contribution of the change of 
household head's labor income. The second part reflects the contribution due to change of 
household heads' employment rate, and the third part reflects the relative contribution of change of 
proportion of household heads' labor income in total household income. If the distribution of 
household heads' labor income is more unequal than that of household total income, then the 
growing proportion of household heads' labor income increases household income inequality. With 
this method, we compare the households in the same decile of income between two time points. We 
compare the households in particular income group in 2011 with the households in the counterpart 
in 1996. In this way, we can say how the gap between today’s rich and poor households in heads’ 
wages, spouses’ wages, their labor supplies, and public transfers differ from the disparities in those 
factors between the rich and the poor in the past.  
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Table 2.5 Composition of HH Income by Income Groups (Working Age HH's). 
 
1996 2011 
1st  10th 1st 10th 
average yearly 
income 
(thousand won) 
HH disposable income 4,741  28,179  7,005  49,558  
average yearly 
income 
(thousand won) 
labor income by heads 4,313  20,251  6,066  37,103  
average yearly 
income 
(thousand won) 
labor income by spouse 1,266  9,035  1,906  16,109  
average yearly 
income 
(thousand won) 
labor income by other families 193  2,616  455  5,404  
average yearly 
income 
(thousand won) 
capital income 234  2,421  48  243  
average yearly 
income 
(thousand won) 
private transfer income 647  806  761  2,233  
average yearly 
income 
(thousand won) 
public transfer income 74  159  949  1,017  
average yearly 
income 
(thousand won) 
tax and social security contribution -399  -1,247  -686  -5,756  
rate/ 
ratio 
employment rate of heads 0.868  0.971  0.822  0.982  
rate/ 
ratio 
employment rate of spouses 0.269  0.445  0.413  0.698  
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1996 2011 
1st  10th 1st 10th 
      
rate/ 
ratio 
proportion of couple family  0.732  0.933  0.620  0.887  
proportion labor income by heads 0.789  0.698  0.712  0.735  
proportion labor income by spouse 0.053  0.133  0.070  0.201  
proportion labor income by other families 0.041  0.093  0.065  0.109  
proportion capital income 0.049  0.086  0.007  0.005  
proportion private transfer income 0.136  0.029  0.109  0.045  
proportion public transfer income 0.016  0.006  0.136  0.021  
proportion tax and social security contribution -0.084  -0.044  -0.098  -0.116  
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, HES 1996, HIES 2011. 
 
The decile distribution ratio increased from 5.9 in 1996 to 7.1 in 2011 (Table 2.5). The dispersion of 
household heads' labor income increased and that of spouses' labor income also rose. The spouses' 
employment rates increased in both low income and high income groups. The proportion of couple 
families decreased in both income groups, with a larger drop in the low income group. 
<Table 2.6> presents the decomposition of change of household income difference between the 
highest and the lowest income groups in the period of 1996 and 2011. The dispersion of labor 
income seems to be more responsible to the increasing inequality in the recent 15 years than the 
change of labor supply. The difference of labor income is greater than that of total household income 
(122%). In particular, the household heads' labor income dispersion explains 111% of total household 
income, which means that labor market inequality has been a key driving force of the household 
income inequality. The change of labor supply also explains a part of household income inequality. 
On the other hand, redistribution policies such as public transfer and tax contribution seem to 
contribute to the reduction of income gap between the high and low income groups.  
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Table 2.6 Decomposition of Change of Income Inequality: Gap between the highest and the lowest 
income groups (Working Age HH's ). 
 
estimates contribution 
Total  0.1743 1.0000 
Head’s labor income (2) 0.1941  1.1133  
Spouse’ labor income (5) 0.0193 0.1108 
Head’s labor supply (3) 0.0476 0.2728 
Spouse’ labor supply (6) 0.0025 0.0144 
family structure (7) 0.0131  0.0753  
labor income by other family members (9) -0.0102  -0.0585  
capital income (11) -0.0266  -0.1527  
private transfer income (13) 0.0682  0.3913  
public transfer income (15) -0.0310  -0.1780  
tax and social security contribution (17) -0.0845  -0.4846  
composition of income (4+8+10+12+14+16+18) -0.0303  -0.1739  
Notes: Numbers in bracket refer the terms in <Appendix Table 1>. 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, HES 1996, NSHIE 2011. 
 
To sum up 
In order to determine factors driving inequality, we compared income inequalities between Korea 
and other countries through different viewpoints and time series trend changes and analyzed 
changes during the last 15 years, during which the inequality has escalated. The results are 
summarized as follows. 
First, comparisons with other countries indicate that Korea’s market income dispersion is well 
balanced. This suggests that active labor market participation from the low income class has offset 
inequality of individual labor income. While household market income is relatively balanced, the 
dispersion of disposable income drops to the average level of compared countries. The reason is 
because Korea’s redistribution system does not function as well as developed countries. 
Second, a time series approach to income inequality shows that the inequality declined significantly 
in the late 80s, before escalating again in the mid-90s. The changes coincide with the activation of 
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labor strikes in 1987 and the financial crisis in 1997. We have noted an increasing gap between 
market income inequality and disposable income inequality. 
Third, among the four hypotheses considered to explain the increasing inequality of income over the 
last 15 years, the inequality of wages seemed to have the largest impact on income inequality. The 
aging of the society was another factor. During the last 15 years, the inflow of female labor did not 
have any effect in easing the income inequality, while tax and income transfer helped reduce 
inequality. 
The two most noteworthy factors are wage dispersion and female labor supply. The current analysis 
shows that the most noteworthy factor driving income equality is the increase of wage inequality in 
the labor market during the last 15 years. The figures in the following chapters show that the rise and 
fall of household income inequality coincides with the changes and trends of wages in labor market. 
Even so, wage inequality did not fully translate to household income inequality thanks to the active 
labor force participation of the low income classes(Chang 2012). However, it is unlikely that such 
effects will continue. Labor market participation from low-income class females offset the wage 
inequality of household heads surrounding the 1997 Asian economic crisis(Lee 2008), but analyses of 
recent 15 years show that such effects have disappeared. Considering that spouses’ labor market 
participation rate of high-income household heads in Korea is lower than that in developed countries, 
it is unlikely that the inequality mitigating effects of household labor supply patterns will continue.  
 
2.2  Wealth and Debt Inequality  
In the 2000s, increasing wealth inequality and the household debt problem have come to the fore as 
one of the most serious social issues in South Korean society. With the worsening of employment 
situations and job stability, wealth accumulation by way of investment in housing and financial 
market began to be widely perceived as an alternative to wage earning in the labor market. At the 
level of policy and institutional environments, the Korean government enacted laws to promote the 
residential mortgage market and pushed policies to boost the housing market as a reaction to the 
1997 Asian financial crisis. These changes affected the radical rise of real house price, the increase of 
wealth inequality, and the exacerbation of the household debt situation. After the Asian financial 
crisis, Korean society experienced a simultaneous increase in income and wealth inequality, which 
reinforced mutually(Shin, 2011a: 225). 
Actually, the wealth inequality of Korea is relative low compared to other countries. The net wealth 
GINI, which is around mid 0.6 in 2011, is lower than the US and Sweden(around 0.8). And, it was not 
so high before the financial crisis. Korea has very unique housing system, joense, in which a renter 
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makes deposit around half of market price to home owner for the rent period. The deposit is usually 
debt from financial institutions. So, Lee and Lee (2001) argues that net worth is more adequate than 
total wealth for measuring wealth inequality due to the deposit. It is 4.9% of total asset in average, 
but 27.9% for the lowest quintile by asset(see [Table 2.6]). As survey of wealth are not available over 
long-period, it is impossible to provide consistent evidence, [Figure 2.6] shows that the net worth 
GINI has leveled up with the financial crisis in 1997. Nahm(2009) estimates that the upper quintile of 
asset classes gained 71.46% among the total asset increase in Korea from 2001 to 2006, while the 
bottom quintile only 0.77%.  
  
Table 2.7 Changes in Inequality of Household Asset, 1993-2011 (GINI coefficient). 
 
Source: Daewoo Economic Research Center, Korean Household Panel Study, 1993-1998; Korea National 
Statistical Office, Survey of Household Wealth, 2001, 2006; cited from Lee and Lee (2001: 44), Nam (2009: 
67).Korea National Statistical Office, Survey of Household Finance, 2010, 2011;  
Note: The data from 1993 to 1998 do not include households in rural areas. 
  
Among different forms of assets, the tangible assets (real estate), and the housing assets in particular, 
are far more important than the financial ones in household wealth. In 2001, the share of tangible 
assets within total household assets of Korea amounts to 72.2%, which is 20%p higher than in Japan 
during the same period. As we see in [Table 2.7], during the years 2001 through 2006, the share of 
tangible assets increased by 6.1%p as house price rapidly increased over the period 2002-2007. It 
was back to 72.5% in 2011 as the house price stagnates. 
It is particularly noteworthy that the larger the amount of total assets, the larger the relative share of 
tangible assets within the total assets, and that the upper quintile possesses a significant part of the 
wealth in land and building, while the wealth of the middle classes is centered in the housing assets . 
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Table 2.8 Portfolio Composition of Household Wealth measured by Wealth Quintile (%). 
 Quintile by Asset (2011) Quintile by Income (2011) 
 Total  1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  Total  1st 2nd  3rd  4th  5th  
Total Assets 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Financial Assets 24.0 51.4 46.0 31.4 24.3 18.7 23.2 18.5 21.4 24.7 23.0 24.0 
  
Deposit for 
Housing 
4.9 27.9 24.4 13.1 6.7 2.8 6.3 7.3 8.1 8.2 6.7 4.9 
Tangible Assets 72.5 39.3 47.8 64.0 72.2 78.9 73.6 80.1 75.8 71.9 73.6 72.5 
  
  
  
Housing 33.8 18 36.2 49.0 47.9 36.1 39.7 51.8 46.3 42.3 42.3 33.8 
Land 11.1 4.3 3.1 5.9 9.7  16.5 13 18.4 15.4 14.2 13 11.1 
Building 26.7 16.2 8.3 8.8 14.1 25.5 20.3 9.7 13.9 15.2 17.7 26.7 
Debt/Total Asset 18.4  106.4  27.5  20.5  16.1  14.2  18.4  17.5  13.3  17.0  16.9  17.6  
Net Worth/Total 
Asset 
81.6  -6.4  72.5  79.5  83.9  85.8  81.6  82.5  86.7  83.0  83.1  82.4  
  Quintile by Asset(2006) Quintile by Asset(2001) 
  Total 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  Total 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  
Total Assets 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Financial Assets 21.7 57.1 38.9 31.0 27.0 16.5 27.8  62.9  59.8  38.6  28.8  21.2  
Tangible Assets 78.3 42.9 61.1 69.0 73.0 83.5 72.2  37.1  40.1  61.4  71.2  78.8  
  
  
  
Housing 41.1 35.5 52.5 55.1 49.5 35.9 53.1  32.4  37.9  57.5  64.5  50.7  
Land 29.3 5.2 7.6 12.2 20.6 36.8 12.9  3.4  2.2  3.1  5.8  18.5  
Building 6.6 1.3 0.2 0.5 1.3 9.7 6.2  1.3  0.1  0.7  0.8  9.7  
Debt/Total Asset 13.2 78.7 27.4 19.5 14.1 9.1 14.6  99.5  24.2  18.3  15.1  9.9  
Net Worth/Total 
Asset 
86.8 21.2 72.6 80.5 85.9 90.9 85.4  0.5  75.8  81.7  84.9  90.1  
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. , National Household Survey, 2001 and 2006; cited from Nam (2009: 
66).  
 
After a short breakdown of the housing market in 1998 caused by the financial crisis, real house 
prices in Korea soared twice in the 2000s. Although this occurred in close relationship with the 
expansion of mortgage markets, Korean society did not develop toward a liberal model of 
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‘homeowner society’ or ‘asset-based welfare,’ which presupposes more access to residential 
mortgage for a broad range of the population and a consequent increase in homeownership rates. 
Despite the continuous increase of housing supply rate throughout the 2000s, the homeownership 
rate in Korea remained constant throughout the whole period (Figure 2.7). This means that a limited 
number of the upper and middle class possessed more houses than before, while more than half of 
Korean households do not have a change to buy their own house. If we observe the change of 
housing assets before and after the radical rise of real house prices from 2005 to 2007, it becomes 
evident that only the upper income class profited from the housing boom, while the low income class 
did not increase ([Table 2.8)).  
Then, what we find in [Table 2.7] is that asset poverty became very severe problem recently. The net 
worth of 1stquintile by asset became negative in 2011. This might reflect the fact that debt has 
increased very fast as housing market stagnated since 2007. 
The main driver of household income inequality is growing inequality of labour income. This is due to 
the fact that the share of labour income is still high(more than 70%) even though inequality of asset 
income is higher and the labour market is the most hard hit by the crisis. Then, there is still a problem 
that the survey does not grasp all of asset income. As we see in Figure 1.4, the labor share in the 
national account started to stagnate since 1996 even though the ratio of self-employment decreased 
and the ratio of wage earners increased, which means that the share of asset income or other 
incomes increased. Some studies using other data argue that the contribution of asset inequality to 
income inequality has increased. It is true that labour income is the most important factor of growing 
inequality, but we could not overlook the asset inequality.  
 
Figure 2.7 Trends in homeownership rate, housing supply rate, and house price, 1995-2010. 
 
Source: For homeownership rate, Korea National Statistical Office, Population Housing Survey, every year; for 
housing supply rate, Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, Statistical Yearbook; for house price 
trends, OECD, Economic Outlook 2010, source data. 
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 (Unit: 10,000 won) 
Table 2.9 in Housing Assets measured by Income Levels. 
  2006 2010 increasing rate 
total 11,803  14,507  (22.9) 
Low Income 5,607  6,045  (7.8) 
Middle Income 10,033  13,313  (32.7) 
High Income 27,535  34,228  (24.3) 
Source: Korean Research Institute for Human Settlements, Survey of the 2010 Residential Situation in Korea, 
Statistical Report, p. 15. 
Note: The survey included households with null housing asset. 
 
2.3  Labor Market Inequality 
As we see in the above, the growing household inequality was driven mainly by the worsening labour 
market inequality. The wage GINI coefficient is higher than the income one. Considering that the 
wage inequality index are from the 『Basic Wage Structure Survey』(the Ministry of Employment 
and Labor) which covers only regular workers in establishments with 10 or more employees, and the 
low wage workers are usually concentrated in small establishments, the real wage GINI coefficients 
would be higher than the statistics.2 According to OECD(2008, p358), the wage inequality in Korea is 
the highest after the US in 2006. The wage inequality index for Korea of OECD was calculated using 
the same survey 『Basic Wage Structure Survey』, including only establishments with 10 or more 
employees. Seong(2010) compared Korean and US wage inequalities with the same standard to find 
that the wage inequality of Korea is higher than that of the US between 2000-2010.  
The GINI coefficient of hourly wage is higher than that of total wage. Low wage workers compensate 
for their lower hourly pay with longer working hours([Figure 2.9]). The GINI coefficients change little 
even when part-time workers are left out. 
                                                                
2 The total number of employees covered in the 『Basic Wage Structure Survey』(the Ministry of 
Employment and Labour) is 6.47 million while the number of employees surveyed in the 
『Economically Active Population Survey』and『National Survey of Household Income and 
Expenditure』 (the Korean National Statistical Office) is 16.97 million in 2010. The wage GINI 
coefficient was calculated 0.503, using tax data on wage income from National Tax Service(Kim, 
2012).  
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Figure 2.8 Trends in GINI Coefficient(1981-2010). 
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor, 『Basic Wage Structure Survey』 
Note: 1) Calculations of Dr. RohDae-Myung (Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs) 
2) Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
Figure 2.9 Monthly Working Hour by the Hourly Wage Decile. 
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor, Raw data of『Basic Wage Structure Survey』, each year.  
 
What we can see in the wage decile ratios in the [Figure 2.10] ～[Figure 2.13] is that the P50/P10 
ratio starts to increase from 1989 while the P90/P50 ratio starts to increase from 1999. This implies 
that the relative wage growth rate of low wage workers has been low since 1989, and much lower 
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since 1999 after the financial crisis. On the contrary, the relative wage growth of the middle wage 
group has been higher for 1981-1997, but lower for 1998-2007 than those of the high wage group. It 
can be said that the overall wage disparities between wage groups has been enlarged after the 
financial crisis in 1997.  
 
Figure 2.10 Trends in Decile Ratios (Hourly Wage, 1981-2010). 
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor, Raw data of『Basic Wage Structure Survey』, each year.  
 
To understand the trends of structure of wage inequality, we estimate Mincer-type wage equations 
in the form of: 
Log(hourly wage) = α + β1*Male(dummy)+ β2*Age+ β3*Age+ β4*Ten+ β5*Tensq+β6*Establishment 
Size(dummy)+β7*Manufacturing Sector(dummy)+ β8*Production Occpuation(dummy)+β9*Senior 
College(dummy)+ β10*Junior College(dummy)+ β11*High School(dummy)+ ε.  
 
In this equation, we will focus on coefficients on senior college and establishment size. As we see in 
[Figure 2.11], the turning point is 1992 for senior college and 1993 for large establishments(with 300 
or more employees). The college wage premium after 1992 has gone hand in hand with the 
incredible growth of college graduates(Figure 2.11). It is thought to be due to the skill-biased 
technological change such as IT(Korea is one of the most rapidly growing country in IT manufacturing 
and consumption). Then, many studies show that very rapid expansion of trade with China has 
increased demand for high-skilled workers, destroyed medium-skilled jobs, and raised wage 
inequality(Nahm 2010a, Nahm 2010b, Ok et al. 2007, Ahn et al. 2007). The degree of dependency of 
foreign trade has very similar shape with GINI coefficient such that it was 78.9% in 1980, the lowest 
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55.5% in 1993, and now 105.5% in 2010(Figure 2.12) and the trade structure has changed from the 
US-oriented to China-Oriented one(Figure 2.12). Nahm(2010) said that the growing wage inequality 
is kind of opportunity cost for the change from low-skill abundant country to high-skill abundant one 
with extending trade with China.  
The growing educational wage inequality cannot be fully explained only by labour supply and 
demand. Labour market institutions are also important factor in growing inequality. Kim shows that 
increase in the share of non-regular employment raised educational wage inequality and Seong(2011) 
shows that tenure explained the difference between the US and Korea wage inequality which could 
not be explained by the coefficient on college education. The wage premium for tenure is higher in 
Korea, and tenure is differently distributed within the same education level group. Particularly, there 
are bid differences in tenure across firm and establishment size. Tenure is kind of proxy variable for 
job stability.  
Figure 2.13 shows that the figure of GINI coefficients have almost same shape even within the same 
educational group. Then, the GINI figure of college graduates in large establishment(500 or more 
employees) had different shape, relative lower increase in 2000s. This means that even within the 
college graduate group, there could be great wage differentials across establishment size. The 
economic restructuring in the wake of the financial crisis strengthened the power of the surviving 
large firms, and the full opening of the market to the world economy weakened SMEs. The fully 
opened market also favored large firms rather than SMEs. Furthermore, employment has not 
increased significantly in the large firm sector, increasing only in the SMEs sector. Low wage workers 
are concentrated in SMEs. As we will see in Chapter 5, the wage equalizing effect of labour 
unions(particularly concentrated in large establishments) has been diminishing in 2000s, and the 
effect of minimum wage policy on reducing inequality was not high. This means that extending 
educational opportunity is not enough and changes in economic structure and industrial organization 
and labour market institutions are important to reduce overall wage inequality in Korea.  
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Figure 2.11 Wage Premiums for Senior College and Large Establishments(1981-2010). 
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor, Raw data of『Basic Wage Structure Survey』, each year.  
Note: Large Establishments are those with 300 or more employees.  
 
Figure 2.12 Export and Import share to total, 1980-2011. 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
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 (By educational level)                        (By establishment size, College Graduates Only) 
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor, Raw data of『Basic Wage Structure Survey』, each year.  
 
Although we do not have long time series for employment type data, employment type(regular or 
non-regular) is also one major driver of growing wage inequality. [Figure 2.14] shows that wage of 
non-regular worker relative to those of regular worker was 67.1% in 2002, but it rapidly decreased to 
54.6% in 2009. Labour market flexibilization after the financial crisis increased both the share of non-
regular workers and the wage differentials across employment type, which contribute to the overall 
wage inequality growth.  
 
Figure 2.14 Wage Inequalities by Employment Type (Non-Regular/Regular). 
Sources: Korea National Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey. 
 
There are very little reliable data on income of self-employees in Korea. The Korea Welfare Panal 
Study by KIHASA(Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs) provide income data on self-employees, 
but the survey started in 2005([Figure 2.15]). Generally, the income inequality among self-employees 
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Figure 2.13 GINI Coefficients by Education and Establishment Size(1980-2010). 
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is higher than that of wage earners. The total GINI coefficient increases around 3.5-7.5% when self-
employees are included in the workforce. Its contribution to the increasing income inequality may 
not be so great considering the decreasing share of self-employment in the workforce. As we have 
already seen in the previous chapter(2.1. Decomposition of the change in income inequality), the 
main driver of inequality increase for 1996-2011 was household labor income, particularly 
employment income rather than business and capital income. 
 
Figure 2.15 GINI Coefficients of Wage Earners and Self-Employees. 
Source: Korea Welfare Panel Study wave 1~4. Ji(2011).  
 
The financial crisis in 1997 caused so-called ‘employment crisis’, which has been regarded as the 
main driver of increasing income inequality. The employment rate among those aged 15-64 started 
to increase in 1984 due to participation growth of female workforce. However, it stagnated after the 
crisis. The employment rate has not recovered its pre-crisis level even though more than 10 years 
have passed since the crisis. The stagnating employment rate would have increased the earning 
inequality of the entire working-age population beyond the earnings inequality among workers. 
[Figure 2.16] and [Figure 2.17] show the employment rates by gender and education. As we will see 
in the next section, educational attainment has increased very rapidly since the early 1990s. In the 
midst of growing academic achievements, employment accessibility of lower educated person has 
been lowered since 1999, particularly in the male labor force. This means that the inequality 
mitigating effects of relatively higher accessibility to the labor market of low skilled workers have 
been reduced.  
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Figure 2.16 Employment Rate by Gender(aged 15-64, 1982-2011). 
Sources: Korea National Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey. 
 
(Male)                                      (Female) 
Sources: Korea National Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey. 
 
2.4  Education Inequality  
In the sphere of development economics, it is well-known that Korea has been successful in 
obtaining so-called ‘shared growth’(growth without inequality) for the 3 decades since the 1960s by 
extending opportunities in education for all. Even after the 1980s, the educational opportunities 
have been still extended.  
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Figure 2.17 Employment Rate by Gender and Education(aged 15-64, 1982-2011). 
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In the [Table 2.9], the average education years was only 7.6 in 1980, 9.5 in 1990, it is now 11.6 in 
2010. It is 14.1 for the age group of 20∼29, which maybe among one of the world highest 
educational attainments. Particularly, for this age group, the average education year of female(14.3) 
is higher than that of males(14.0).  
During the past five decades, the growing educational attainment years have caused more equal 
distribution of education level of labor force in Korea. [Figure 2.18] shows GINI coefficients of 
educational attainment years since 1994. It was 22.1 in 1994, and then 18.5 in 2010. While the 
decreasing trends are similar between male and female, there are some differences between age 
groups. In the younger generation, educational distribution are more equally distributed. This is 
because the educational system has extended step by step over the long time period from primary 
school in 1960-70s to middle and high school in 1970-80s, and then to tertiary education in 1990s. 
 
Table 2.10 Average Education Years by Age and Gender Group. 
(Total) 
 
all age 6∼19 20∼29 30∼39 40∼49 50∼ 
1980 7.6 6.5 9.9 9.2 7.5 4.2 
1985 8.6 6.7 11.0 10.1 8.5 4.6 
1990 9.5 7.7 12.0 11.1 9.5 5.5 
1995 10.3 7.0 12.7 12.1 10.5 6.3 
2000 10.6 5.7 13.1 12.8 11.2 7.2 
2005 11.2 4.2 13.8 13.6 12.3 8.2 
2010 11.6 4.8 14.1 14.0 13.0 9.1 
 
(Male) 
 
all age 6∼19 20∼29 30∼39 40∼49 50∼ 
1980       
1985 9.7 6.7 11.3 10.9 9.9 6.5 
1990 10.6 7.7 12.3 11.8 10.6 7.6 
1995 11.2 6.7 12.7 12.8 11.5 8.6 
GINI Country Report Korea 
Page 42 
 
all age 6∼19 20∼29 30∼39 40∼49 50∼ 
2000 11.5 5.3 13.0 13.2 12.0 9.2 
2005 12.1 4.0 13.6 13.8 12.9 10.0 
2010 12.4 5.0 14.0 14.1 13.4 10.6 
(Female) 
 
all age 6∼19 20∼29 30∼39 40∼49 50∼ 
1980 
      
1985 7.6 6.7 10.6 9.3 7.1 3.1 
1990 8.6 7.8 11.8 10.4 8.3 3.9 
1995 9.4 7.2 12.7 11.6 9.6 4.8 
2000 9.8 6.0 13.2 12.5 10.5 5.5 
2005 10.5 4.3 13.9 13.3 11.7 6.7 
2010 10.9 4.5 14.3 13.9 12.6 7.7 
Sources: Korea National Statistical Office, Household and Population Survey. 
 
Figure 2.18 GINI Coefficient of Educational Years(1994-2010). 
 
Sources: Korea National Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey. 
 
Meanwhile, the entrance rate to tertiary education has continued to increase since the 1990s. It 
soared from 34.3% in 1992 to 83.8% in 2008([Figure 2.19]). Since 2009, females took over males in 
terms of entrance rate to tertiary education. As the government has lifted the regulation which has 
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contained establishing new universities and extending entrance quota in 1995, university and college 
entrance have grown at a historically unprecedented rate.  
 
Figure 2.19 Entrance Rate to Tertiary Education(1990-2010). 
Source: Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology, Yearbook of Educational Statistics 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. Ministry of Employment and Labor of Korea, Basic Wage Structure 
Survey. 
Note: Wage Premium are calculated from Mincer-type wage equations in the form of: Log(hourly wage) = α + 
β1*Male(dummy)+ β2*Age+ β3*Age+ β4*Ten+ β5*Tensq+β6*Establishment Size(dummy)+β7*Manufacturing 
Sector(dummy)+ β8*Production Occpuation(dummy)+β9*Senior College(dummy)+ β10*Junior College(dummy)+ 
β11*High School(dummy)+ ε. 
  
Even though the educational opportunity in terms of quantity has been extended for all for a long 
time, the inequality of educational expenditure by income has also been enlarged since 1993 when 
the entrance rate to tertiary education started to increase as we can see in [Figure 2.20]. In 2011, 
high-income households with incomes exceeding 6 million won per month spent 11.7 times more in 
education than low-income households with incomes of 1 million won or less per month. This figure 
was only 5.5 times in 1993. This may be due to the increasing expenditure on private education. 
Korean universities and colleges are thoroughly and exhaustively ranked by scores of entrance 
examination, which has induced expenditure on private education. 
OECD Education at a Glance(2011) shows that private expenditure at the level of primary, secondary, 
and post-secondary non-tertiary education in Korea is over 70%, which is the highest next to Chile, 
and more than double the OECD average. The highly heated competition to enter “top class” college 
might be a mirror to the increasing inequalities in the labor market.  
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Figure 2.20 The Ratio of Education Expenditure by income level relative to households with 1,000 
thousand or less income. 
(1990-2010, ten thousand won) 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure. 
 
2.5  Conclusion 
The Korean income inequality accelerated after the crisis, and has gradually increased since then. 
Though diverse factors such as changes in labour market, population and family structure, and 
redistribution policies, have contributed to this increase, the main driver is household heads' 
worsening labour income distribution. Though the wealth inequality has leveled up with the crisis, its 
contribution is not great because not only the share of asset income but also the wealth inequality is 
still low. The labour income inequality is higher and increasing more rapidly than the overall 
household market income inequality. Particularly educational wage inequality has accelerated since 
1993 due to increasing skill demand caused by increasing trade with China and expanding IT 
technology.  
But the labour supply and demand do not fully explain the educational wage inequality. Labour 
market institutions, which are reflected on the variables such as establishment size, tenure(job 
stability), employment types, are also important factor in growing inequality. The effects of including 
self-employment on increasing income inequality may not be so great considering the decreasing 
share of self-employment in the workforce. 
Education, important inequality-reducing factor, has dramatically expanded and become equally 
distributed in terms of quantity. The differentials in educational quality, however, have increased due 
to the increasing differential of educational expenditure by the income.  
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One caveat in interpreting the inequality is that the available data might underestimate the reality of 
inequality in Korea. The long-term trends of Gini are calculated only based on the survey data for 
urban household with 2 or more excluding single household and rural household. The wage 
inequality is only for regular employees in establishments with 10 or more as well. Kim(2012), who 
has analyzed the National Tax Service data, shows that the Gini is 0.503 compared to the Gini from 
the Basic Wage Survey,0.373 in 2011. It is because the survey data has the possibility of excluding the 
highest income earners and seasonal, causal workers. As we already see, the top 1% income can be 
underestimated due to the data availability. The stagnating labour share in spite of the increasing 
wage earners and the decreasing self-employees’ income, mean increasing share of asset income or 
other incomes. The survey data cannot fully grasp asset and top incomes. The real inequality might 
be higher and faster worsening than the survey data-based inequality index shows. 
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3 The Social Impacts of Inequality 
3.1 Introduction 
We have discussed general trends and main drivers of inequality in Korea for the past 3 decades in 
chapter 2. Growing inequality has various impacts on material deprivation, poverty, social exclusion, 
family formation, health, housing, crime, happiness, and social mobility. Though inequality is 
expected to have negative effects, they could change between periods and be different among 
subgroups. In this chapter, we are trying to focus on changes of effects before and after the mid-
1990s – the diminishing and growing period of inequality in Korea. However, it could be limited in 
that data are not available in many sectors. We also tried to show the relationship between social 
changes and inequality index(GINI) if data are available. In describing the social impacts of growing 
inequality we try to draw out some unique features pertaining to Korea. 
3.2 Material deprivation 
It is a fact that material hardship has been relieved with economic growth in Korea. For example, the 
share of a family of four with only one room housing was 38.7% in 1980, 19.2% in 1990, and 0.3% in 
2010. But, the diverse material deprivations have different figures between income groups(<Table 
3.1>). The share of persons experiencing one of material deficiencies(food, housing, utilities, and 
medical treatments) in one year is 34.2% in the lowest quintile compared to 2.9% in the highest 
quintile in 2009.  
 
Table 3.1 Experience of material hardship across quintiles of income distributions. 
 total Top 
Quintile 
4th 3th 2th Bottom 
QuintileⅠ 
Experience of material hardship 17.0 2.9 8.7 17.2 21.8 34.2 
Deprivation Food 12.4 1.5 2.7 10.5 16.4 30.8 
Housing 5.0 1.4 5.2 8.3 5.6 4.6 
Utilities  3.9 0.3 1.8 3.9 5.2 8.5 
Medical care Treatment 3.5 0.5 3.0 4.8 4.2 5.2 
Multiple deprivation 8.1 1.2 3.9 8.1 9.8 17.3 
Number of deprivation areas 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 
Source: Lee(2011). Data Source: Korean Institute of Health and Social Affairs, 2009, Korean Welfare Panel 
Survey 4th Wave. 
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Korea has not developed an official and internationally comparable index to estimate the level and 
trends of material deprivation such as that used in EU-SILC. Then, personal credit default seems to be 
one of the most relevant indicators reflecting the way inequality has impacts on material deprivation 
in Korea. Most Korean people borrow money from various financial institutions including commercial 
banks credit card companies for various ends such as home ownership, housing rent, living costs and 
even speculation on the stock market. With payments arrears by three consecutive months over 
300,000 won (around 250 US $), they became credit defaulters. It becomes difficult for credit 
defaulters to live an ordinary life. The financial crisis has caused not only the higher inequality but 
also a growing number of credit defaulters([Figure 3.1]). The share of credit defaulters to 
economically active persons has increased from 6.57% in 1997 to 15.47% in 2004. In 2005, the 
government abolished the registering of credit defaulters to abate their burden. But it is known that 
their share persists up to the present time.  
 
Figure 3.1Share of personal credit defaulters to Economically Active Persons and GINI(Disposable 
Income). 
Unit: %. 
Source: Korea Federation of Banks and Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
3.3 Cumulative disadvantage and multidimensional measures of poverty and 
social exclusion 
One feature of poverty in Korea is its repetition(Lee and Jung, 2001, Hong 2005). Escaping rate from 
poverty is relatively high, but the reentering the poor is not rare in Korea. The rate of escaping from 
absolute poverty within one year has been around 50-60% and one from relative poverty(below 50% 
of median income) was also over 30%. Three year poverty persistence rate is estimated 14%(Hong 
2005), five year 16%(Kim and Noh, 2009). They are not so high compared to other countries. 
However, the poverty maintaining rate has been increasing since 2000([Figure 3.2]). It is also known 
that the income mobility in Korea is relatively high compared to other countries, but it has also been 
increasing since 2000([Figure 3.3]).  
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Table 3.2 Poverty Entry Rate and Poverty Exit Rate by Year. 
  
Year 
Minimum cost of living Median income 50% 
  market income Disposable income market income Disposable income 
Poverty 
Entry 
2006 5.18 5.98 7.3 7.65 
2007 4.78 5.36 6.53 6.88 
2008 4.32 4.95 6.95 7.31 
2009 4.08 4.49 6.7 6.7 
Poverty Exit 
2006 55.67 55.25 32.62 35.43 
2007 53.04 53.54 43.97 33.24 
2008 54.58 54.27 29.26 31.05 
2009 55.49 54.64 28.81 31.28 
Data: Korean Institute of Health and Social Affairs, 2009, Korean Welfare Panal Survey 1st-4th Wave. 
 
Figure 3.2 Trends in Income Mobility(1year) and GINI(Disposable Income). 
Source: Kang et. al(2011) 
Data: Korea National Statistical Office, Household Income and Expenditure Survey, each year. 
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Figure 3.3 Trends in the share of person maintaining income class (1year). 
 
Sources: Chen(2009) &Lee(2009). 
Data: CNEF 2005 release. Inequality and mobility are measured using the mean log deviation GE(0), and Korea 
labor and Income Panal Survey(the Korea Labor Institute).  
 
3.4 Indicators of social cohesion 
Discourse on social cohesion is flourishing due to growing inequalities, the growing number of non-
regular workers, unequally distributed opportunities for the young, females, and the handicapped. 
Social exclusion may cause people live in isolation. In Table 3.4, it is examined how many people 
respondents contact with per day by two criteria: age and household income. In terms of age, it is 
clear that the older people contacts with less people. Also, household members with higher income 
contact with more people.  
 
Table 3.3The number of people, contact with per day(%). 
 0-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100- Can’t choose 
Household 
income 
(Unit 
=10,000 Won) 
0-100 39.2 27.4 18.4 10.8 1.9 1.4 0.9 
100-199 30.5 27.1 19.8 14.9 4.2 1.5 1.9 
200-299 24.4 27.5 27.1 11.5 5.1 2.0 2.4 
300-399 20.8 27.9 27 14.2 8 2.2 
 
400- 13.6 24.0 24.4 22 8.4 7.2 0.4 
Source: Korean General Social Survey 2004 
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We can estimate the social networks of Koreans through examining whether respondents have 
people to ask for help. According to the Korean General Social Survey data(2004), the majority of 
respondents reported that they will ask for help to family, such as a spouse or mother. An answer 
that they will ask for help to social organizations or institutes was insignificant. As shown in Figure 3.1, 
there are differences in social networks by educational level. When asked whether they have people 
to consult distress, of the respondents who reported "Have", 87.4% are "college or university 
graduate over" while 70.6% are "elementary school graduate & under". The relation between 
educational level and social networks(in terms of consultation of worries) clearly emerges. The 
difference by educational level is evident especially in economic problems. When asked whether they 
have someone to borrow money from, of the respondents who reported that "don't have", 40.3% 
are "college or university graduate & over" and 65.5% are "elementary school graduate & under". 
 
 
Wanted to talk about                Needed to Borrow Money  
Source :Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
3.5 Family formation and breakdown, lone parenthood, and fertility 
There has been a great change in family formation in the period of growing inequalities in Korea 
while the one interacts with the other. As we can see in <Table 3.4>, Shares of single-person family, 
female house-head family, and divorced house-head family have increased since the mid-1990s 
when inequality started growing. The changes such as increasing share of single-person or female 
house-head family might have contribute to growing inequality, which might have contribute to 
growing divorce by economic problems. The poverty rate of female house-head family is higher than 
average household poverty rate and started to increase more rapidly since 2000.  
As we can see in [Figure 3.5], the crude divorce rate, and the share of divorce by economic problems 
in particular show similar trend with that of GINI. While there are few studies about causation 
Figure 3.4 Social networks(2011). 
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between income distribution and divorce, some studies(Jung 2008, Jung 2004) show that 
unemployment of male-house-head and increase of housing rent have significantly contributed to 
increasing crude divorce rate. It is sure that the employment crisis following the financial crisis in 
1997 has significant effects on increasing divorce rate and family breakdown. The employment crisis 
has very close relationship with increasing inequality since 1997 as we see in chapter II.  
 
Table 3.4 Changes in Family Formation. 
  
average 
number of 
family 
member  
single-person 
family 
Divorced-
person 
Household-
head family 
single-parent 
family 
Female 
household
- head 
family 
relative poverty rate 
of female 
household-head 
family(absolute 
poverty) 
1980 4.5 4.8 0.9  9.3 14.7   
1985 4.1 6.9 1.1  8.9 15.7   
1990 3.7 9.0 1.5  7.8 15.7   
1995 3.3 12.7 2.1  7.4 16.6   
2000 3.1 15.5 3.9  7.9 18.5 14.7(7.4) 
2005 2.9 20.0 5.7  8.6 21.9 19.1(9.4) 
2010 2.7 23.9 7.3  9.2 25.9 20.1(10.0) 
Data: Korea Women’s Development Institute, 2011, Gender Statistics in Korea.  
 
Figure 3.5 Trends in total dissolutions and crude dissolution rate (1989-2011). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
0,23
0,24
0,25
0,26
0,27
0,28
0,29
0,30
0,0
5,0
10,0
15,0
20,0
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
%
 
Dissolution rate (per 1,000 persons) Divorce by economic problems
Gini (disposable)(right axis)
GINI Country Report Korea 
 
Page 53 
Figure 3.6 and III-7 show features of lone-parent households in comparison to two-parent 
households by two criteria; educational level and occupation of household heads. In the case of two-
parent households, 45.3% of household heads fall under a category of college graduation and above. 
On the other hand, households whose heads graduated college and above account for 21.6% of total 
lone-parent households. In terms of occupation, there are clear differences. Although the proportion 
of elementary occupations and craft workers in two-parent households is higher than in lone-parent 
households, the proportion of jobless in lone-parent households is much higher than in two-parent 
households. Also, managers, professional and related workers who earn relatively high incomes 
centered on two-parent households. 
 
Figure 3.6 Comparison between two-parent households and lone-parent households by 
educational level in 2008. 
Source: Kim(2010). 
 
Figure 3.7 Comparison between two-parent households and lone-parent households by occupation 
in 2008. 
Source: Kim(2010) 
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Low fertility rates are at the center of public attention in Korea. Korea’s population increased rapidly 
in 1950 and 60s, bearing the word "baby-boom generation". This tendency began, however, to slow 
down after the period of growth and the fertility rates declined dramatically since the 1970s. As 
shown in Figure 3.8, the fertility rate has kept declining, to 1.12 in 2006, among the lowest in the 
world.  
 
Figure 3.8 Total fertility rate. 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
Different factors can be suggested as a cause of decreased fertility rates. Practice of birth control 
policy is mainly pointed out as a main cause of it in the 1970-1980s. Since the 1990s factors bringing 
about low fertility rates have been usually analyzed in terms of increase in childcare burden due to 
rising living costs, growing number of two-income families, and poor provision of childcare 
infrastructures. As shown in Figure 3.9, the number of young married people declined rapidly 
particularly since the financial crisis in 1997. Drivers of low fertility rates seem also to have effects on 
the declining number of marriages, especially after the economic crisis in 1997. The age of first 
marriage also increased, and it seems to reflect economic and cultural changes. Youth 
unemployment seems to make, among others, the economic situation for young people worse 
delaying their decision to marry. 
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Figure 3.9 Trends in crude marriage rate and GINI(disposable income)(1990-2010). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
While the family structure are influenced cultural and historical factors, the Korean family has broken 
down by socio-economic factors in 1997, and could not recover its pre-crisis family structure in terms 
of family formation, divorce, marriage, and fertility. We think that this is closely related to labor 
market situations and its effects on income distribution.  
 
3.6 Health inequalities 
Life expectancy at birth in Korea has increased to 77.2 years(for men) and 84.1 years(for women) in 
2010. It was only 67.3(for men) and 75.5(for women) in 1990, 61.8(for men) and 70.0(for women) in 
1980. There may be several possible explanations for the increased life expectancy. The most 
persuasive explanation is that it may be due to economic development and improvements in living 
conditions. The following public health interventions and progress in medical care have contributed 
to the extension of life expectancy. 
Self-reported health status is one of the most apparent indicators reflecting income inequalities. 
Figure 3.10 shows that although self-reported health status in general measured by percentage of 
those who reported their health status as ‘good’ or ‘very good’ has maintained relatively constant 
level in spite of some fluctuation between 1986 and 2009, lower-income groups have consistently 
reported poorer health status than higher-income groups. This trend persists. While only 38% of 
people in Korea reported to be in good health in 2010, much lower than the OECD average of 70%, 
about 42% of the top 20% rated their health as 'good' or 'very good', compared to about 34% for the 
bottom 20%(http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/health/). 
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Then, it is difficult to find an evidence for the hypothesis that the growing income inequalities extend 
health inequalities since 1997 crisis as is shown in Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11.  
 
Figure 3.10 Trend in self-reported health status (1986-2009). 
Source: OECD statistics. 
 
In Figure 3.11, it is not likely that the inequality gap between income classes in terms of self-reported 
health status is widened for both male and female since 1998. But it is also difficult to say that the 
health gap reduced because the survey method has changed in 2007(Shin, 2009). It seems that the 
relationship between Income inequality and health inequality is not clear in Korea.  
 
Figure 3.11 Share of Self-Reported Health Status as ‘Good’(1998-2009). 
 Male Female 
Source: Based on the statistics in Shin(2009).  
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3.7 Housing tenure 
As shown in chapter 2, the housing supply rate has increased continuously, exceeding 100% since the 
early 2000s. But we can expect there are severe housing inequalities in terms of residence type. 
Figure 3.12 shows the trends in the type of housing occupancy between 1985 and 2010. The most 
important feature is that the proportion of tenement and monthly rent is high and the proportion of 
free rents including public housing is very small. Korean residential systems centered on jeonse and 
monthly rent have institutionalized lack of stability and economic disadvantages for tenants(Shin 
2011b). 
 
Figure 3.12 Households by type of housing occupancy (1985-2010). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
One unique feature of Korean house rent practice lies in the so-called jeonse, in which a renter 
makes a lump-sum deposit on a rental space at some proportion of the market value to house owner 
instead of paying monthly rent. At the end of the contract, usually after 2 years, the house owner 
returns the amount to the renter. 
While Jeonse was established in the early stage of economic development when housing financing 
was weak, it had a function of easing burden of house rent for the poor and middle classes. And 
during times of high interest rates and increasing housing prices, house owner can make profits on 
the lump-sum deposit. But in the 2000s when interest rates went down, some house owner began to 
convert jeonse to monthly rent. As Figure 3.16 shows, the proportion of jeonse in household type has 
fallen 28.2% in 2000 to 21.7% in 2010. It caused financial difficulties to house renters who are usually 
in low income. 
The change of house rent practice might add financial difficulties to the disadvantaged. In Figure 3.13, 
we see the proportion of households in arrears with rent above 4 times between income groups. The 
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proportion of low income households is much higher than the proportion of general households, up 
to five times.  
 
Figure 3.13 Arrears with rent by incomes(2006-2009). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
3.8 Crime and punishment 
Korea has changed from lower crime and suicide society to high crime and suicide society since 1990s. 
As we see in Figure 3.14, Crime and suicide have rapidly increased since 1992 and seem to have the 
strongest correlation with growing inequality. The crimes by economic motives and suicide started 
increasing almost at the same time with market income household GINI in 1992(The disposable 
income GINI started increasing in 1993). It is still questionable if they are due to the deterioration of 
income distribution or only reflect long-term trends according to economic development.  
Then, Park et al.(2009), who analyzed causal between crime rate and socio-economic variables 
between 1966-2007, shows that unemployment rate and GINI have significant effects on crime rate 
by economic motives even controlling for economic growth rate, number of population per police 
officer, authority-regime index. More interesting finding is that the period variable(1998-2007) have 
significant negative effects when controlling for all the other variables. In Korea, growing inequality 
and employment crisis following the financial crisis seem to have significant effects on crime rates. 
And, Figure 3.15 shows strong correlation between suicide per 100,000 persons and relative poverty 
rate. It is based on statistics of cities and counties in Geonggi province, the largest province in Korea. 
Eun(2005) shows that there has been no correlation between suicide rate and socio-economic 
variables such as economic growth rate, unemployment rate, income distribution, and household 
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weakness index before 1997, but appeared strong correlation between 1997-2004 when excluding 
15-29 aged group. 
 
 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
Figure 3.15 Suicide Rate and Relative Poverty Rate. 
Source: Gyeonggi Welfare Foundation, Gyeonggi Poverty Map, 2012.  
 
3.9 Subjective measures of well-being, satisfaction, "happiness" 
When asked, "If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would 
you say you are?", 14.5% of all respondents reported "very happy" and 61.6% reported "fairly happy". 
On the other hand, 20.8% and 2.4% of all respondents answered "not very happy" and "not at all 
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happy" respectively. There are differences when investigated by income level. The combined 
proportions of "not very happy" and "not at all happy" of the lowest income group are 39.8%, much 
higher than 12.5% of the highest income group. As expected, the poor find themselves unhappier 
than the rich. 
 
Figure 3.16 Life satisfaction by income level (2007). 
Source: Korean General Social Survey 2007. 
 
According to the OECD life satisfaction indicator, the overall level of life satisfaction in Korea is very 
low. The score for Korea is 4.52, much lower than the average score of OECD countries, 6.35. Korea is 
placed 26th among all 34 countries. 
In Korea, the cause of stress is mainly related to work. When asked, "What do you think is the main 
cause of your stress?", 43.8% of whole respondents answered "work-related" and 24.6% answered 
"money-related". Respondents who answered "Family-related" were 17.3%. However, there are 
differences in main cause of stress by income level. As shown Figure 3.24, money caused much more 
stress in the lowest income households while work led to more stress in the highest income group. 
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Figure 3.17 The main cause of stress by income level (2007). 
Source: Korean General Social Survey 2007. 
 
3.10 Intergenerational mobility 
Rapid modernization in the last half of the 20th century transformed Korea from an agrarian to an 
industrial society making the possibility of upward mobility widely open to almost all people. An 
empirical study using the Korea Welfare Panel Study data conducted in 2005 suggests that mobility in 
income status between generations was considerably active. As reported in Table 3.5 15.3% of 
respondents from very poor families and 15.5% from poor families had grown to be rich.  
Some studies estimated the elasticity of offspring’s income to parent’s one as 1.5-2, the lowest level 
in OECD. Yang(2012), however, estimated it again controlling for sample selection bias, and produced 
estimates 3.5-4. It is lower than other developing countries, but not lower than other OECD countries.  
It is widely known that it is not any more possible for dragon to come into being in the brook(humble 
family) in Korean society at the moment. Even in the period of wider chances of mobility, the window 
of opportunity was not evenly distributed depending on family backgrounds. The poorer one was 
during childhood the more likely that one remains poor in his or her adulthood. It might be that 
“parent’s poverty reduced children’s education level and then the low education level increased the 
likelihood that children experience poverty in their adulthood”(Lee 2008). 
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Table 3.5 Intergenerational income mobility. 
 
Children 
1 q. 2 q. 3 q. 4 q. 5 q. 
Parents 
Very poor 33.3 19.7 16.8 15 15.3 
Poor 21.6 21 22.1 19.9 15.5 
Middle 17 19.9 20.4 20.1 22.7 
Rich 20.8 18.2 15.4 22.6 23.1 
Very rich 19.3 20.4 10.8 22.6 26.9 
Source: Lee(2008) 
 
Private expenditure on education plays an extraordinary role in reproducing income strata between 
generations. The relatively active intergenerational income mobility we have seen was attained when 
private tutoring was forbidden from 1980 to the late 1990s. The odds ratio between the social status 
of respondents’ parents when they were 14 years old and their status in adulthood appears to be 
comparably low for the cohorts of people born in 1961-1980, who attended middle and high school 
without private education. Prohibition of private education contributed to increase intergenerational 
mobility. 
 
Figure 3.18 Intergenerational mobility measured by odds ratio. 
Source: Jang &Han(2011) 
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But since the Constitutional Court judged prohibition of private tutoring unconstitutional in 2000, the 
private education market has enjoyed unending expansion. Rich parents now spend more money in 
private teaching for their children than poor parents as Table 3.6 reveals. 
 
Table 3.6 Average private education expenditures per student by household income. 
Unit: ten thousand won. 
Year 100 & less 100-200 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-600 
600-
700 
700 and 
over 
2007 5.3  10.7  17.7  24.1  30.3  34.4  38.8  46.8  
2008 5.4  10.8  17.7  24.5  30.6  35.6  40.2  47.4  
2009 6.1  11.0  18.0  24.6  31.0  37.2  42.0  51.4  
2010 6.3  10.3  17.0  24.0  29.8  36.2  40.4  48.4  
2011 6.8  10.9  17.4  23.4  29.0  34.0  39.4  44.0  
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
Private education has proved to very strongly impact children’s school performance. Students within 
the top 10% in terms of school achievement are usually children of richer parents who spend more 
money than the poorer. Students with higher school grades are expected to enter so called “top class 
universities”, whose graduates are promising candidates for employment to advantaged 
establishments that can afford to pay more money than others.  
 
Table 3.7 Average monthly private education expenditures per student by student’s school 
performance. 
Unit: ten thousand won. 
Year within top 10% 11-30% 31-60% 61-80% 
within bottom 
20% 
2007 30.0  26.6  21.0  15.9  12.0  
2008 31.5  27.5  22.5  17.6  12.9  
2009 31.9  28.3  23.2  18.4  13.9  
2010 31.7  28.2  23.3  18.2  13.6  
2011 30.5  27.7  23.0  18.0  13.2  
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
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From 2000 on, private education has served as a transmission belt by which the socioeconomic 
status of parents is, partly but significantly, conveyed to their children. Comprehensive data has not 
been accumulated to estimate whether and to what extent private education has impacts on wage 
inequality in next generation. Graduates who entered universities after private education played the 
deciding role in admission are now beginning their job careers. However, it is obvious that 
intergenerational mobility will prove to be highly restricted by the mediating effects of private 
tutoring. Parents’ socioeconomic status is transferred to the next generation via private tutoring. 
 
3.11 Conclusions: Appraisal of the interdependence and the 'national story' of 
inequality drivers and their social impacts 
With growing inequality since late 1990s the poor and less educated have been more exposed to 
social risks than the rich and more educated in terms of material deprivation, social exclusion, single 
household, poor health, committing crimes, and feeling unhappy, as can be expected.  
Korea experienced so dramatic changes in many respects since mid-1990s, which is the turning point 
of inequality from decreasing to increasing. So, many social changes are highly correlated with 
growing inequalities. We could find strong correlations in such areas of share of credit defaulters, 
poverty and income mobility, crime rate, suicide rate, family breakdown, divorce rate, marriage rate, 
mobility by generations even though it is difficult to find strong evidence of its causation. But Some 
empirical studies cited gave some evidence about causation between growing inequality and social 
changes. The evidence of social impacts of growing inequality could be well found in Korea after mid-
1990s.  
Material deprivation is found to be concentrated on lower income groups. And, the share of personal 
credit defaulters go hand in hand with growing inequality, but it is not clear that it is a direct 
consequence of growing inequality or just reflect the fact that he poor are more vulnerable to 
economic fluctuation. 
In particular, crime, suicide, marriage rate have high correlations with growing inequality. Some 
empirical studies back this fact up, and show that employment status seems to be more important 
than changes in disposable income distribution in their causation. Family breakdown such as 
increasing single-parent family and divorce rate and decreasing marriage rate also has high 
correlations with growing inequality.  
The subtle change of housing tenure practice is significant to residential inequality in Korea. With 
lowering interest rates, many house owners converted Jeonse, a unique Korean housing practice to 
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monthly rent, which causes financial burden to house renters who cannot usually afford to own a 
house. This may strengthen the already-existing residence-related inequality.  
We also show that the poverty persistency has been raised and income mobility and mobility by 
generation have decreased as inequality grows. Social mobility in both intra-generational and inter-
generational terms has been decreased in the recent two decades. Korean society has been 
characterized by active social mobility in the age of rapid industrialization, but poverty persistence 
and slowdown of income mobility suggest that chances of status advancement were reduced 
gradually. Reduction of intergenerational mobility poses a more serious problem. Socioeconomic 
status of one’s parents is inherited from generation to generation by the mediating effects of private 
tutoring. Korea has become a more and more closed and rigid society in the recent decades. 
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4 The political and cultural impacts 
4.1 Introduction 
Growing inequality has political and cultural impacts on various aspects of everyday lives, including 
political and civic participation, social trust, political values and legitimacy, and values about the 
welfare state. In this chapter we describe the general pattern of growing inequality’s impacts on the 
political and cultural lives of Korean people. We make an attempt to present features unique to Korea.  
 
4.2 Political and civic participation 
After a long period of military dictatorship Korea accomplished political democracy in the legal sense 
in 1987, including direct election of the president. The turnout rate for the presidential election in 
1987 was 89.2%, highest in the last three decades. Since then it has gone down consistently to 63% in 
2007. The turnout rates for National Assembly elections have also declined from 75.8% in 1988 to 
54.3% in April 2012. Turnout rates seem to have decreased with growing inequality, but it is hard to 
draw a causal relation, as they continued to fall since the 1980s when the GINI coefficient was 
relatively low, and that various factors other than inequality have effects on them.  
 
Figure 4.1 Average monthly private education expenditures per student by student’s school 
performance. 
Source: National Election Commission. 
 
One of the peculiarities of voting behavior in Korea is that more educated are less participatory. OECD 
comparative statistics report that more educated people are more participatory in election. But this is 
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not the case for Korea. Whereas voter turnout of less educated people was 68.2% in the 2008 general 
election, that of higher educated people was only 60.1%. The decline in political participation and low 
participation of more educated people implies that some form of political cynicism has emerged, 
especially among the educated. The lower participation of highly educated persons can also 
explained by the high correlation of education and age effects. Because Korean society has 
experienced rapidly extended educational opportunities in recent several decades, young people 
tend to be educated more than old people. And young people are more likely to participate to voting 
in the most countries. According to Figure 4.2 the adults with less than high school education shows 
very high percentage of voting participation, and most of them are supposed to be older people. 
Figure 4.3 shows the older people are more likely to participate to vote than the young people do, 
and the turnout gap between age groups seem to be getting greater.  
Figure 4.4 tells us the relationship between income level and voter turnout for various elections in 
the last decade. Whereas for the two Presidential elections in 2002 and in 2007 the turnout 
difference among income groups doesn’t seem to be clear, persons with low income show lower 
turnout than those with mid or high income in national assembly or local elections. In particular, the 
second quintile income group participates to voting with lowest percentage. 
 
Figure 4.2 Percentage of voting by education level. 
 
Source: Korean General Social Survey 
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Figure 4.3 Percentage of voting by age group. 
Source: Korean General Social Survey 
 
Figure 4.4 Percentage of voting by income level. 
Source: Korean General Social Survey 
 
Another indicator of social participation is informal social activities, such as social meeting, religious 
organization, hobby and sports, and local community meetings. As we see Figure 4-3, more than half 
of Korean people are not active in social organization in the 2000s. 
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.6 represent community activity participation by income and education. Richer 
people are frequent participants in various activities. While more than half of people with 3,000 
thousand won in household income a month are active in informal social organization in 2011, family 
members from lower incomes appear to be inactive. Education seems to be another factor 
determining participation rates in social activities. While more than half of college or university 
graduates are vigorous participants of social activities low educated people are not so much active as 
the high educated. Participation in informal social activities is proportional to income and education, 
and this trend appears to have continued with the increase in inequalities. 
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Figure 4.5 Participation rate in community activities. 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
Table 4.1 Community activities participation by household income. 
Unit: Ten thousand Won a month, % 
Year under 100 100-200 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-600 600 and over 
2006 29.6 36.0 39.6 44.3 48.5 48.9 
2009 30.0 35.3 39.5 45.6 49.9 51.7 51.5 
2011 33.4 42.1 47.4 50.4 54.1 53.8 60.5 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
Figure 4.6 Community activities participation by education. 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
4.3 Trust in others and in institutions 
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belongs to the group of low-trust countries. We report how much confident Korean people are with 
their major political institutions from Figure 4.7 to Figure 4.9. The questionnaire reads: “As far as the 
people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, 
some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?” Figures give us percentages of people 
who have a great deal of confidence or some confidence. Three stylized features are observed here. 
First, overall confidential level decreased in 2000’s as comparing to around 1980. Second, members of 
the National Assembly have been the least trusted among the three political institutions. More than 
70% of Korean people have not expressed any confidence in them in recent years. Among the major 
national institutions, Korean people expressed the most confidence in the Supreme Court. Third, 
confidences on those institutions are not clearly different by income level.  
Figure 4.10 reports how much confident Korean people are with other people in general. The 
questionnaire reads: “Do you think you can trust the most people in general, or cannot trust?” 
Whereas about the half of Korean people regards others as trustful, the other half do not trust others 
or expressed reserved attitudes. The way of asking must be carefully identified. The survey did not 
ask whether each respondent does agree that most people can be trusted. 
Unfortunately we cannot find old survey asking this general trust questionnaire and cannot identify 
the long term trend on the issue. However, the recent survey result shows that more people in high 
income group express trust in others than people in low income group. This result suggests a 
possibility that persons in economic deprivation may lose their trust in others. Low levels of trust in 
others and the national institutions have gone in line with the trust level of society in general. The 
same social survey as Figure 4.10 questioned “Generally, how trustful do you perceive this society to 
be?” on a 10-point scale. The results reveal that Korean society is regarded as not so much trustful by 
their people. 
 
Figure 4.7 Trust in parliament by income level. 
Source: Korean General Social Survey for 2003, 2006, 2009, 2010, Social Development and National Value 
Survey for 1981 
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Figure 4.8 Trust in government by income level. 
Source: Korean General Social Survey for 2003, 2006, 2009, 2010, Social Development and National Value 
Survey for 1981 
 
Figure 4.9 Trust in the legal system by income level. 
Source: Korean General Social Survey for 2003, 2006, 2009, 2010, Social Development and National Value 
Survey for 1981 
 
Figure 4.10 Trust in general: % of saying "can trust others in general". 
Source: Korean General Social Survey for 2003, 2006, 2009  
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Trust and fairness can be seen as the two sides of the same coin. Figure 4.11 represents how fair 
Korean society is perceived to be in areas such as education, employment, legal system, media, and 
taxation by their citizens. Korean society is deemed unfair in all areas. Among others, taxation and 
employment are frequently pointed out to have unfair systems. It is natural that these areas are 
found to be the most in need of urgent improvement for a fair society in the same survey. While we 
do not report detailed tables or figures, the same survey suggested that the priorities of tasks for a 
fair society are ranked differently by education and income. While lower educated people think a 
fairer labor market is the most important, citizens with higher education more frequently picked law 
enforcement and media to be in need of improvement for a fair society. Similar trends are observed 
with an angle of income. Family members with lower incomes are inclined to point out employment 
as being the priority compared to those with higher incomes. It is interesting that the percentage 
preferring taxation for prior improvement to other areas is stable around 30%, regardless of income. 
The necessity of more fairness in the tax system seems to be widely acknowledged.  
 
Figure 4.11 Evaluation on state of fairness (2011). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
4.4 Political values and legitimacy 
Growing inequalities could have impacts on the political terrain. Korean politics has been 
characterized by longstanding conservatism. But we observe some change in the political atmosphere 
in recent years.  
Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13 show the result of asking “How much do you think you are politically 
liberal or conservative?” in Korean General Social Survey and getting 5-point measures, such as very 
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liberal, somewhat liberal, neither liberal nor conservative, somewhat conservative, very conservative. 
Of course, ‘very liberal’ nor ‘very conservative’ is same as ‘extreme left nor extreme right’. According 
to the figures around 30% of overall population are considering themselves liberals, including either 
very liberal or somewhat liberal. Those identifying themselves as conservatives are also around 30% 
in 2010. Here, it would be better to mention that either ‘very liberal’ or ‘very conservative’ are only 
less than 10% of all respondents.   
The difference of political orientations between the poor and the rich is also worthy to note. The poor 
tend to be considering themselves liberal than the rich do in Korea. Among people in the lowest 20% 
of household income group the proportion of liberals was approached to 40% in the mid-2000s. 
Although people in the highest 20% of income group express themselves liberal with lower 
percentage than their poor counterpart, those identifying themselves as liberals have increased since 
the mid 2000s. On the other hand, people considering themselves as conservatives have slightly 
declined since the survey conducted in 2003. The declining tendency was clearer for both the poor 
and the rich than for middle income population, with one exceptional year of 2008 when the 
Presidential election was conducted. 
Citizens in Korea have long been discontent with politics. The percentage of those who are satisfied 
with politics has remained around 10% in the same survey. But it is remarkable that the number of 
those who are “very dissatisfied” has sharply declined in recent years. However deeply dissatisfied 
with politics Korean people are, they express some hope. The percentage of people who are positive 
about future prospects of politics has remained around 50%. However, those whose prospects for 
politics are “about the same” have accounted for a considerable share, suggesting a slice of political 
cynicism in that satisfaction with politics has been very low.  
 
Figure 4.12 Political orientation: % of liberal and very liberal by income level. 
Source: Korean General Social Survey.(Seonggyungwan Univ. Survey Research Center) 
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Figure 4.13 Political orientation: % of conservative and very conservative by income level. 
Source: Korean General Social Survey.(Seonggyungwan Univ. Survey Research Center) 
 
We have only two years’ General Social Survey providing clues on Korean people’s attitude to migrant 
workers in Table 4.2. The questionnaire asks how much the respondents agree to each statement 
such as “migrant workers reduce jobs for the native Koreans” “migrant workers are helpful for 
economic development in Korea” “migrant workers are helpful to solve labor shortage problem” 
“migrant workers are economically more harmful to the poor than to the rich” “migrant workers’ 
welfare requirement results in tax increase.” Whereas for the overall population the negative attitude 
against migrant workers was not getting stronger between 2003 and 2010, the negative attitude of 
the low income group seemed to be increased clearly. It is interesting that the high income class 
worry much about tax burden increase, while persons in the low income group think migrant workers’ 
negative effects on them more seriously.  
 
Table 4.2 % agreeing to opinion on migrant workers. 
    total high 20% low 20% 
2003 
reduce job availability  23.1  18.0  33.3  
helpful for economy 52.9  57.7  52.1  
2010 
reduce job availability  28.2  21.9  44.2  
helpful for economy 49.2  58.8  38.5  
helpful for labor supply 76.4  81.3  66.4  
harmful to the poor 36.4  27.5  45.7  
increase tax burden 46.8  56.9  47.2  
Source: Korean General Social Survey 
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Korean General Social Survey tried to measure social legitimacy asking how much the respondents 
agree that getting ahead in society depends on family background only once in 2009 (Figure 4.14). 
About 80% of all population considers family background is at least somewhat important for getting 
ahead. People who believe family background is very or extremely important are found in lower 
income classes with higher percentage.  
 
Figure 4.14 % saying "family background is important for getting ahead" by income level (2009). 
Source: Korean General Social Survey 
 
4.5 Values about social policy and welfare state 
Growing inequalities may cause change of values about social policy and the welfare state. Evidently, 
this seems to be the case with Korea. Korea has long lagged behind as far as the welfare state is 
concerned. However, discussions on welfare state expansion - hardly heard of in Western societies in 
recent years - is much in vogue in Korea currently due to an increased sense of insecurity and growing 
inequalities. 
Korean people are regarded as sensitive to inequalities and having strong orientation towards 
equality. An absolute majority of them have perceived the state of income distribution to be “very 
unfair” or “somewhat unfair.” Figure 4.15 shows the change of attitude on inequality during the last 
decades. The measures come from three different social surveys and it must be mentioned the ways 
of asking are slightly different from survey to survey, although the overall trend can be identified in 
the figure. The proportion of people who consider inequality in Korea is very problematic was higher 
in 1990 than in 1981 and has stayed still since 1990. While the difference among income groups were 
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not clear in 1990 and in 2003, the concern on inequality was lower among the high income class in 
2009.  
Not only the state of income distribution but also the income differences have been a cause of 
growing social uneasiness. Nine out of 10 agree to the assertion that “income differences are too 
large.” Only two or three out of 100 believe that income differences are not too large (Figure 4.16). 
 
Figure 4.15 % agreeing inequalities are problematic in Korea by income level. 
Source: Korean General Social Survey for 2003, 2010 
Source: Survey on Korean Society in Transitional Era for 1990 (Seoul National Univ. Center for Population and 
Development Studies) 
Source: Social Development and National Value Survey for 1981 
 
Figure 4.16 Views on the assertion that income differences are too large. 
Source: Korean General Social Survey. 
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Government is expected to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor (Table 4.3). More 
than 70% of people agree to the view that “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the 
differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.” This kind of 
attitude seems consistent among income groups. It is difficult to find similar measurement on 
government role for redistribution in old surveys. However, 1981 survey asked how much the 
respondents agree to the idea “we need to rapidly realize welfare society even though it requires tax 
increase” and 42% of respondents agreed. This number of percentage can be comparable to the 
features on preferred future society in Figure 4.17. Changes in welfare consciousness can be detected 
by preferred future society. While about half of the respondents want some kind of society with high 
taxation and high welfare, only 11% of people preferred a society with low taxation and low welfare 
in 2006. With those table and figure we can interpret the extended role of government for welfare 
state has been required in recent years than before.  
 
Table 4.3 % agreeing government should reduce inequality by income level. 
    Total high 20% low 20% 
1981 welfare + more tax 42.3  39.1  41.3  
2003 government role for redistribution 79.8  78.3  79.8  
2009 
government role for redistribution 74.7  71.0  72.9  
government role of helping the 
unemployed 
80.6  74.3  84.4  
Source: Korean General Social Survey for 2003, 2010 
Source: Social Development and National Value Survey for 1981 
 
Figure 4.17 Preferred future society (2006). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
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One of the factors that have hindered the development of a welfare state in Korea has been a fear 
that welfare would reduce work incentive. However, growing inequalities and increase in perceived 
insecurity seem to have changed the view. While more than half of people didn’t agree to the 
concern of disincentive, about 35% of people held the traditional perspective (Figure 4.18).  
 
Figure 4.18 People agreeing to the assertion that welfare would reduce work incentive (2007). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
According to the same survey, however, Korean governments in the 2000s seem to have failed to 
satisfy their citizens in alleviating income inequalities (Figure 4.19). More than 60% of people 
responded negatively to the question that reads “Please tell me how well the government is handling 
in reducing income gaps between rich and poor.” Not more than 10% of people highly approved of 
government efforts in reducing income inequalities.  
 
Figure 4.19 Evaluation on government in reducing income differences. 
Source: Korean General Social Survey. 
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Figure 4.20 and Figure 4.21 show another indicator of welfare consciousness. Whereas about half of 
the respondents expressed willingness to bear the burden of tax increase for welfare, only 20% of 
people felt uncomfortable. As Figure 4.21 demonstrates, more educated people are more willing to 
accept tax increases for welfare. According to Figure 4.22, rich people are the most frequently 
preferred taxpayer for welfare expansion (35.8%). About one thirds (34.3%) of respondents stated 
that all citizens should be taxed for welfare expansion. This result could be interpreted as stemming 
from two views about society and the future. One is that income inequalities are too large and, 
accordingly the rich are more responsible for welfare than the poor. Another is the increased need for 
universal welfare. The future of social policy and the welfare state in Korea seems to be formed, in 
part, by the interpretation struggle between the traditional views about welfare that have impeded 
the development of welfare state and the newly emerging ideas that consider social policy 
indispensible for a fair society.  
 
Figure 4.20 Willingness to further taxpaying for welfare (2011). 
Source: No(2011) 
 
Figure 4.21 Willingness to further taxpaying for welfare, by education (2011). 
Notes: F=6.045, P<= 0.001 
Source: No(2011) 
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Figure 4.22 Preferred taxpayer for welfare expansion (2007). 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
With growing inequality, political and cultural life in Korea has changed a lot since the 2000s. 
Tendencies of lower voter turnout rate , low level of trust in society, and pessimistic evaluation of 
income distribution, have persisted in the 2000s as inequality has risen. However, causal claims 
between inequality and its political and cultural impacts are elusive to establish because the political 
and cultural phenomena may have causes other than inequality.  
In the concluding section we present some unique features not usually found in most countries 
covered in the project, as well as the logic behind them. First, although voter turnout has fallen since 
1987, political cynicism measured by nonparticipation in voting can be detected in the more 
educated. It refutes the common wisdom that the more educated, having knowledge and views on 
politics, have a higher propensity to vote. It could be explained in part by differences in voting 
commitment between high and low educated people. 
Second, despite growing inequality and the low level of satisfaction with politics, the politically 
conservative climate has changed little. Growing inequality has seemingly reduced the number of 
self-reported conservatives but they have not converted to liberals but to “neither liberal nor 
conservative”. In 2010 they constitute the largest faction in the political landscape, reflecting another 
aspect of political cynicism. 
Lastly, unlike in the case of most advanced countries, discourse on welfare state expansion is much in 
vogue currently in Korea. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a result of the exhaustion of the 
developmental dictatorship model which had driven Korean people to relentless economic growth 
without social policies. Growing inequality and increase of perceived insecurity after the economic 
crisis in the late 1990s must have contributed to the upsurge of welfare demands. Korea is expected 
to expand social policies as long as inequality continues to rise. 
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5 Effectiveness of Policies in Combating Inequality  
5.1 Introduction 
Korea has very weak social policies before the crisis. Increasing rate of minimum wage does not catch 
up with that of average wage, and it was not well enforced. Although National Pension Scheme and 
unemployment insurance were introduced in 1988 and 1995, they were also very limited in their 
application. The crisis and growing wage inequality, however, precipitated introduction and 
expansion of diverse social policies. In this chapter, we will review inequality-reducing effects of 
minimum wage, labour union, and tax and social expenditure polices.  
 
5.2 Labor Market and Industrial Relations Policies 
As we see in Chapter Ⅱ, as ‘employment crisis’ is the major reason for the increasing income 
inequality, labor market policies are very important to contain the worsening inequality in Korea. 
Particularly, the Korean labor market is well-known for its highly dualized nature(OECD, 2006), with a 
large portion of the low-wage sector. Therefore, minimum wage policy could be a very powerful 
means to combat inequality in Korea.  
Even though the Labor Standards Act enacted in 1953 provides the legal grounds for determining the 
minimum wage, the provisions concerning the minimum wage system in the Labor Standards Act 
were not applied in the initial stages of industrialization. The Minimum Wage Act was enacted and 
promulgated on December 31, 1986, and the Act entered into force on January 1, 1988. The 
minimum wage in 2011 is 4,320 Korean won(around 3.75$) per hour, or 34,560 Korean won per day 
(based on an 8-hour workday) for all types of businesses.  
The minimum wage rate has increased continuously since its initiation in 1988, and the expansion of 
the workplaces for which the minimum wage is applied has contributed to stabilizing the lives of low-
income workers. The number of workers benefiting from the minimum wage has increased 
significantly, and the minimum wage rate has become a standard for various social security systems, 
expanding its social influence. 
As we see in [Figure 5.1], the increasing rate of minimum wage began to catch up with the average 
wage growth rate, and the influencing rate(Number of beneficiaries/Number of targeted 
employee*100) started to increase only after the crisis and the change of political power in 1998.  
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Figure 5.1 Increasing Rate of Minimum and Average Wage, and Application rate. 
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor Minimum Wage Council 
Note : 1) Object of application before '99.8 is establishments whose number of regular employees is 10 & over, 
'99.9~'00.8 is 5 & over, from '00.9 is all establishments.  
2) Influencing rate is ‘Number of beneficiaries/Number of applied employee*100’. 
  
Concerning the distributional effects of minimum wage, Jeong(2011) shows that despite the relative 
increase in the minimum wage(MW/P10), wage-increase rates are still lower at lower wage levels 
over the past 9 years(2002-2010), as shown in [Table 5.1]. Of course, this does not mean that the 
minimum wage does not contribute at all to raising the relative wage level of low-wage workers. 
 
Table 5.1 Wage Decile and Minimum-Wage Increase Rate Trends (Unit: %). 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
MW/P10  80.4  83.0  87.3  95.2  97.0  104.3  102.4  104.3  107.2 
Absolute 
increase 
rate 
P10 8.9  4.9  5.0  3.7  7.1  4.4  10.3  4.2  0.0  
P20 5.0  7.1  6.7  4.2  2.9  5.3  10.8  0.0  7.1  
P30 6.7  7.1  7.1  4.6  4.2  4.0  10.8  0.0  4.2  
P40 6.8  8.3  9.1  0.8  9.1  4.0  7.7  2.0  5.0  
P50 6.7  12.5  7.1  2.7  9.1  3.7  7.1  1.2  8.6  
P60 4.5  14.8  6.1  4.8  5.0  7.1  6.7  0.0  8.3  
P70 5.5  14.3  7.7  4.0  4.2  8.0  11.1  0.0  2.2  
P80 5.8  17.3  6.8  3.8  4.2  9.1  10.0  0.0  6.7  
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P90 4.5  16.1  6.3  8.5  7.1  0.0  9.6  6.4  0.0  
MW 12.6  8.3  10.3  13.1  9.2  12.3  8.3  6.1  2.8 
Relative 
increase 
rate 
P10 2.3  -7.6  -2.1  1.0  -1.9  0.7  3.2  2.9  -8.6  
P20 -1.7  -5.4  -0.5  1.5  -6.2  1.6  3.6  -1.2  -1.5  
P30 0.0  -5.4  -0.1  1.9  -4.9  0.3  3.6  -1.2  -4.5  
P40 0.2  -4.2  1.9  -1.8  0.0  0.3  0.5  0.8  -3.6  
P50 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
P60 -2.1  2.3  -1.1  2.1  -4.1  3.4  -0.5  -1.2  -0.3  
P70 -1.2  1.8  0.5  1.3  -4.9  4.3  4.0  -1.2  -6.4  
P80 -0.9  4.8  -0.3  1.1  -4.9  5.4  2.9  -1.2  -2.0  
P90 -2.1  3.6  -0.9  5.9  -1.9  -3.7  2.5  5.2  -8.6  
MW 5.9 -4.2  3.2  10.5  0.1  8.6  1.2  4.9  -5.9 
Note. Relative increase rate is the wage increase rate relative to the wage increase rate of the median P50. 
Data from Supplementary Survey to the Economically Active Population Survey, by Statistics Korea, 2002–2010, 
Daejeon. 
 
If minimum-wage regulations are strictly enforced and complied with, the wage-increase effect of 
the minimum wage for low-wage workers would be greater. As shown in [Figure 5.2], the share of 
workers earning below minimum wage has been increasing from 2000 to 2009. Even at the moment, 
a considerable number of workers(around 2 million) are below the minimum wage.  
 
Figure 5.2 Share of Workers earning below minimum wage. 
Sources: Korean National Statistical Office, Supplementary Survey of Economically Active Population Survey 
 
Sometimes, it is argued that minimum wage is not effective in reducing household income inequality 
because the minimum wage could result in assisting low-wage workers in high income household. 
Nam(2011) concluded that minimum wage increase did not succeed in increasing household incomes 
for the the lowest percentile.  
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Korea also introduced the so-called EITC(Earned Income Tax Credit) in 2008 to protect low-income 
families. Kang and Sung(2010), comparing the distributional effects of EITC and the national 
minimum wage, concluded that the distributional effect of minimum wage is greater than that of 
EITC, because EITC is limited to a small group of wage income families and the subsidy rate in the 
phase-in range is low. Moreover, they indicates that when the supply of low-skilled labor increases in 
the labor market as a result of EITC, minimum wage would be a more effective way of supporting the 
low income families by preventing wage reduction of low-skilled workers.  
 
5.3 Taxation  
The total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in Korea is about 25.1% in 2010 ([Figure 5.3]), which is 
relatively low compared to other OECD countries. Countries that show a similar level to Korea are 
Japan, the U.S., Turkey, and Mexico. The total tax revenue consists of taxes (19.4%) and the social 
security contributions (5.7%).  
Relatively small rate of tax revenue to GDP and low proportion of income tax are key features of 
Korean tax system. Yang(2012) explains these characteristics with long lasting policies to support 
export-oriented economic development. Low income tax and low social security contribution have 
been required in order to maintain low labor costs, which were necessary to support price 
competitiveness in export-oriented enterprises. Although industrialization has resulted in increasing 
social risks such as unemployment, industrial accidents, and retirement, tax revenue has increased 
with low rate since 1960s.  
 
Figure 5.3 Total Tax Revenue (unit: % of GDP). 
Source: OECD Tax Revenue data 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1972 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Total tax revenue
GINI Country Report Korea 
 
Page 87 
Figure 5.4 Tax Structure by Type (unit: %). 
 
Source: OECD Tax Revenue data, recited from Yang(2012) 
 
Figure 5.5 Change of % of GDP by tax type. 
 
Source: OECD Tax Revenue data, recited from Yang(2012) 
 
[Figure 5.4] shows that the proportion of income tax is relatively low and the property and corporate 
tax component is rather high in Korea to compare with other countries. Income tax revenue is only 
3.6% of GDP and share(s) 14.3% of total tax revenue in 2010. Social security contribution is 5.7% of 
GDP with 22.7% share of total tax revenue. Although the share of consumption tax is 33.9% of total 
tax revenue which is about OECD average, it is only 8.5% of GDP. Corporate tax is 3.5% of GDP and 
13.9% of total tax revenue. Property tax is 2.9% of GDP and 11.6% share of total tax in 2010. 
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The component rate of income tax in GDP has not much changed since 1990. Increasing total tax 
revenue in Korea seems to rely on the rapid increase of the social security contribution during last 
two decades mostly due to the introduction of national pension scheme and health insurance and 
their expansions (Figure 5.3 & Figure 5.5).  
The reason why the share of income tax in GDP has not increased can be explained as various tax 
deduction policies. Although the nominal rates of tax are just around OECD average, the effective 
rates of tax have been maintained at very low level. A single worker with average income pays only 
4.5% of his income. A low income worker with 67% of average income pays only 1.4% of his income 
and a high income worker pays 8.4% of his income for tax. These figures show that the actual tax 
burden is very low for Korean workers, particularly for low wage workers. Social security contribution 
is rather regressive like other countries.   
 
Table 5.2 Effective rate of tax and social security contribution (2011). 
(unit: % to total income, single worker) 
 67% of AW 100% of AW 167% of AW 
income tax 1.4 4.3 8.4 
social security contribution 8.1 8.1 6.9 
total 9.5 12.4 15.3 
Source: OECD Tax Revenue data, recited from Yang (2012) 
 
5.4 Social Expenditure 
5.4.1 Overall Social Expenditure  
The gap between market income inequality and disposable income inequality implies the 
effectiveness of taxation and income transfer to reduce inequality. In 2006, the GINI coefficient of 
market income was 0.368 and that of disposable income was 0.311, suggesting that tax and public 
transfer lead to a 15.7% decrease in the GINI coefficient. This amount of inequality reduction seems 
relatively small, considering the 30~40% reduction of other countries. As we argue in Chapter 2 of 
this country report, however, the effectiveness of redistribution policies of Korea has been improved 
since the 2000's. In this chapter, we review several important redistribution policies and their effects 
on inequality reduction. 
The overall social expenditure as a percentage of GDP is 7.5% in 2010, which is the lowest level in the 
OECD countries, far behind Japan and the U.S. as well as the Slovak Republic and Estonia (OECD, 
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Social Expenditure DB, 2010). This results in insufficient expenditure for redistribution policies, and it 
may be the most important reason of the ineffectiveness of inequality reduction policies in Korea.  
The composition of social expenditure as well as its percentage of GDP is quite important in 
understanding the nature of Korea's welfare state. [Table 5.3] shows the change of social 
expenditure structure by program since 1990. In-kind benefits for health care consist of huge part of 
total social expenditure in Korea, although the share has been decreased with other income transfer 
programs expanded. The share of old age pension in public expenditure seems not very large 
comparing to other countries, although the number of beneficiary has been increased, mostly 
because other expenditures have been increases as well. Social assistance belongs to “other” 
category. The share of “other” area is found to increase in 2000’s and accounts for about 10% in total 
social expenditure.3 Korean welfare system doesn’t have some typical income transfer programs, 
such as sick pay and family allowance.  
Counting mandatory private expenditure, the structure of social expenditure turns out as <Appendix 
Table 3>. Radical change is found in old age pension area, due to the proportion of mandatory 
retirement allowance.  
 
Table 5.3 Social expenditure by program (1990, 2000, 2007). 
1990 Cash in-kind Total 
OLD AGE 20.58  0.97  21.55  
SURVIVORS 5.32  0.19  5.51  
INCAPACITY 9.48  0.92  10.40  
HEALTH   54.30  54.30  
FAMILY  0.04  1.07  1.11  
ALMP   0.94  0.94  
UNEMPLOYMENT       
OTHER  5.27  0.93  6.20  
Total 40.69  59.31  100.00  
    
 
    
                                                                
3 Classification of social assistance changed in early 2000’s and the large proportion of social assistance is 
assigned from cash to in-kind benefits.   
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2000 Cash in-kind Total 
OLD AGE 25.40  0.44  25.84  
SURVIVORS 3.43  0.16  3.59  
INCAPACITY 5.82  1.89  7.70  
HEALTH   45.43  45.43  
FAMILY  0.06  2.23  2.30  
ALMP   7.99  7.99  
UNEMPLOYMENT 1.63    1.63  
OTHER  5.38  0.14  5.53  
Total 41.72  58.28  100.00  
    
2007 Cash in-kind Total 
OLD AGE 19.02  2.27  21.29  
SURVIVORS 3.28  0.07  3.35  
INCAPACITY 5.74  1.54  7.29  
HEALTH   46.24  46.24  
FAMILY  0.27  6.32  6.59  
ALMP   1.72  1.72  
UNEMPLOYMENT 3.30    3.30  
OTHER  1.68  8.55  10.23  
Total 33.29  66.71  100.00  
Source: OECD Social Expenditure DB 
 
How effective are taxation and public transfer programs in reducing income inequality in Korea? The 
gap between market income and disposable income- based GINI coefficients provides us insight in 
the overall redistributive effects of taxes and social expenditure in general. [Figure 2.1] and [Figure 
2.2] show that the policy effectiveness, although low in absolute terms, has increased since 2000's. 
The disposable income-based GINI coefficient was 0.311 and the market income-based GINI 
coefficient was 0.342 in 2011, which implies a reduction of about 9%.  
Tax and public transfer systems seem effective for reduction of absolute poverty, comparing their 
effects on income inequality measured by GINI coefficients. The absolute poverty ratio for the total 
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population was 12.1% with market income, and reduced to 8.7% of disposable income in 2010, which 
is a 28% reduction (Figure 5.6). In terms of relative poverty, the gap between market income and 
disposable income shows poverty reduction of about 20% for each population group(Figure 5.7). 
Major income transfer programs in Korea include social assistance, public pensions, and 
unemployment benefits. In the next section, we will discuss the effect of each program for inequality 
reduction. 
 
Figure 5.6 Absolute Poverty Ratios calculated with market and disposable incomes. 
Data: Korea National Statistical Office, Household Income and Expenditure Survey (1990 ~ 2006) 
Note 1: urban data = two or more person households which include wage and salary workers. From 2006, HIES 
Note 2: provide information on the whole HHs including one-person HHs and non-wage workers HHs. 
absolute poverty ratio = proportion of persons with equivalized HH income below the minimum cost of living 
which is measured by government every three years; relative poverty ratio = proportion of persons with 
income below 50% of equivalized HH median income 
 
Figure 5.7 Relative Poverty Ratios calculated with market and disposable incomes. 
Note: See Figure 5.6.  
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5.4.2 Public Income Transfer Programs 
Social Assistance  
The Korean social assistance program, called the National Basic Livelihood Security System (NBLSS), 
was enacted in 1999 and implemented in 2000. Before 2000, the Livelihood Protection System had 
worked in order to reduce poverty for 40 years, but under the system the living expenses and 
medical care were provided only to the poor who are not able to work. The NBLSS was evaluated as a 
structural reforms and a new paradigm of anti-poverty policies. The new system emphasizes the 
state's responsibility in poverty reduction and the right of people to receive public assistance 
regardless of their ability to work. Cash and in-kind benefits are provided to the poor to guarantee a 
minimum standard of living. It is noteworthy that the year of the program initiation was directly after 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Since 1998 the number of the poor and unemployed had increased 
rapidly, and an expansion of the social safety net was urgently required.  
The proportion of recipients among total population increased from less than one percent to about 
three percent following the NBLSS reform. The number of public assistance recipients increased from 
385 thousand persons in 1995 to 1,412 thousand persons in 2000. The benefit per person also 
increased about threefold following the NBLSS reform. The share of the public assistance budget has 
been increased and was recorded as 35% of social security expenditure, 12% of government 
expenditure and 0.7% of GDP in 2007 (Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.4 NBLSS Benefit Recipients and Budget Share. 
  
1995 2000 2005 2010 
recipients 
no. of recipients(thousand persons) 385 1,412 1,513 1,550 
% of total population 0.66 3.0 2.9 3.0 
Budget 
% of social security expenditure - 29.8 34.0 34.9* 
% of GDP - 0.4 0.5 0.7* 
* year of 2007 
Note: Korean Ministry of Health and Social Welfare website for 2000~2010 statistics, Kang(2008) for 1995 
statistics 
 
How effective is the NBLSS program in reducing poverty in Korea? According to Yeo & Song(2010) 
who calculated the poverty ratio reduction effect of NBLSS for the working age population using the 
Korea Welfare Panel Survey (KoWePS) 2008 data, the redistributive effects of public transfer mostly 
step from social assistance, although the share of transfer income to disposable income itself is quite 
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small in Korea. The poverty ratio of market income was 12.1, and after adding social assistance 
benefit, the rate was reduced to 10.0(Table 5.5). Although the poverty reduction effect of social 
assistance is still quite low relative to other advanced countries, the program’s effectiveness has 
increased since the reform in 2000. [Figure 5.6] and [Figure 5.7] show the changes of the poverty 
ratios and the increasing gap between the market and the current income, which might be 
understood as the results of the extended public assistance of NBLSS.  
 
Table 5.5 Poverty Ratios after Each Public Income Transfer in selected countries. 
 
market 
income 
+ 
0 
+ 
social 
allowance 
+ 
public 
pension 
+ 
unemployment  
insurance 
+ 
other 
social 
insurance 
+ 
social  
assistance 
+ 
total 
transfer 
Korea 12.1 12.1 11.0 12.0 11.9 10.0 8.5 
Germany 15.8 14.8 12.4 14.1 13.9 14.0 5.2 
Sweden 17.3 16.4 16.2 14.5 8.8 15.8 3.0 
UK 21.0 20.0 20.3 20.9 18.8 11.5 5.4 
Source: Yeo &Song(2010)  
notes: Poverty ratio is defined as 40% or less income of median income in this table. Population is limited to 
people in HHs headed by working age persons. data: KoWePS 2008 for Korea, LIS wage iv for all other countries 
 
Old-Age Pension 
The old-age pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP is only 1.82% in 2010, which is low among 
OECD countries. Immaturity of the public pension scheme and the relatively young population 
structure mostly explain the low level of pension expenditure. Korea is a rapidly aging country but 
still has a relatively young population structure compared to other developed countries. Korea 
introduced an income related national pension scheme in 1988, but the proportion of pension 
recipients among the old population is still low because of the requirement of at least 20 years of 
subscription. As a consequence, the old-age poverty ratio is 45%, which is the highest among the 
selected countries (Table 5.6).  
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The structure of old-age income security is presented in [Figure 5.8]. The first pillar of Korea’s public 
pension system consists of two parts. The first is the tax-based "Basic Old Age Pension." Some 70% of 
those aged 65 and over received the means-tested Basic Age Pension in 2010. This benefit is very 
small amount of less than 100US$, which is fixed at the level of 5% of the earnings of the insured of 
the national pension. The second part of public pension system is the National Pension Scheme, 
which is an earnings-related social insurance. The public pension in Korea is the National Pension 
Scheme(NPS), which is an income maintenance against economic distress due to retirement. The 
public pension scheme was first provided to public servants, military personnel, and school teachers 
in the 1960's and 1970's. The National Pension Scheme for all Korean citizens was established by the 
National Pension Act in 1986 and implemented in 1988. The NPS is compulsory insurance for 
employees and the self-employed, while it is voluntary insurance for housewives and students. The 
insured will be entitled to the Old Age Pension upon reaching age of 60, so long as the person 
insured has contributed pension premiums for at least 10 years. The second pillar of the pension 
system is the retirement allowance or occupational pension which is compulsory, although these are 
not counted as a public income security system.  
The major part of the old-age pension system, National Pension Scheme, is evaluated as a rather 
progressive system including redistributive functions, since benefits are decided on the bases of the 
average earnings of the insured as a whole as well as on the individual earnings of the insured. The 
statutory replacement rate of the pension for 40 years of contributions was 50% in 2008, but will be 
reduced 0.5pt every year up to 2028 until reaching 40%. The actual replacement rate can be 
estimated as [Table 5.7], reflecting the change of statutory replacement rate and applying more 
realistic durations of contribution.  
 
Table 5.6 Old Age pension expenditure and poverty ratios in selected countries. 
(units: %) 
  
proportion of 
elderly population 
pension 
expenditure to 
GDP 
poverty ratios of 
the elderly 
population 
working age 
income support 
to GDP 
poverty ratios of 
the working age 
population 
Canada 13.9 4.80 7.25 3.14 12.69 
Germany 20.3 13.23 8.28 5.25 11.76 
Greece 18.7 13.18 20.51 2.22 10.19 
Japan 22.8 10.70 20.55 1.88 12.47 
Korea 10.7 1.82 45.10 1.56 10.91 
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proportion of 
elderly population 
pension 
expenditure to 
GDP 
poverty ratios of 
the elderly 
population 
working age 
income support 
to GDP 
poverty ratios of 
the working age 
population 
      
Netherlands 15.2 5.77 2.35 7.12 8.39 
Sweden 18.1 8.76 6.08 7.76 5.17 
United Kingdom 16.3 6.21 10.43 5.03 7.87 
United States 12.8 6.83 23.72 2.21 16.07 
Source: Seok(2012) 
 
Table 5.7 Structure of Old-age Income Security (2010). 
Private 
 
3'rd Pillar Private pension 
2'nd Pillar 
Statutory 
Retirement 
Allowance 
or 
Occupational 
Pension 
 
Retirement Allowance 
Public 
Income- 
Related 
(social 
insurance) 
1'st Pillar 
(1-2) 
National Pension Scheme 
(recipients: 28.3%) 
Special Occ. Pension 
(Civil Servants and others) 
Fixed-Rate 
(Tax-based) 
1'st Pillar 
(1-1) 
Basic Old Age Pension 
(recipients: 70%; 
22% of them benefit NPS as well. 
8.5% of them benefit NBLSS as well.)  
Public 
Assistance 
0 pillar 
National Basic Livelihood Security System 
(recipients: 8.5%) 
Source: Seok(2012) 
 
 (unit: %) 
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Table 5.8 Expected Actual Replacement Rates of NPS by Joining Time. 
Income  join in 1988  join in 2008 
150% of mean 42.5 31.3 
mean 52.5 37.5 
1/2 of mean 82.6 56.2 
Note: Seok(2012), estimated on the assumption of 30 years of contribution. 
 
[Table 5.8] and [Figure 5.9] shows us estimates of the effect of the old age pension system on 
reducing the poverty of the elderly. The extremely high poverty ratio of the elderly does not 
decrease even after applying several public income transfer programs to them. Although the national 
pension scheme makes the largest contribution to poverty reduction, the effects are far from 
impressive. This is partly because the pension scheme has not matured yet since the initiation in 
1988 and also because regular workers in large-sized companies were covered by the scheme at the 
early stage of program development, which means the poorer elderly are still not covered by the 
scheme. The basic old age pension does not contribute to old age poverty reduction, although the 
program covers all the elderly persons except the highest 30%. With such small amounts of income 
transfers, poverty reduction effects cannot be realized.  
 
Table 5.9 Relative Poverty Ratios after Each Public Income Transfer. 
 
Market income 
+ 
0 
+ 
national 
pension 
+ 
basic 
pension 
+ 
other 
transfer 
+ 
total 
public 
transfer 
total pop 25.8 23.9 25.5 25.5 22.3 
younger than 60  14.9 14.6 14.7 14.7 13.5 
60 or older 60.7 53.7 59.9 59.9 50.4 
Source: Kang &Choi(2011) data: Korea National Statistical Office, Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
2009 
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Figure 5.8 Absolute and Relative Poverty Ratio of the people 65+. 
Note: See Figure 5.6. The old is defined as people who aged 65 or older. 
 
Unemployment Benefits Program 
Korea’s Employment Insurance System (EIS) and its unemployment benefits program (UB) were 
launched in 1995 and have gone through a series of institutional improvements for the purpose of 
reinforcing its effectiveness as a safety net for the unemployed. During the last economic downturn 
caused by the Global Financial Crisis, more than 40% of the unemployed received benefits in 2009.  
[Figure 5.10] shows an indicator of the UB's effectiveness as a safety net, the proportion of UB 
recipients to the unemployed. The monthly average number of UB recipients and its proportion to 
the unemployed has increased since the year of program initiation, mostly due to three important 
institutional changes (Hwang 2012). First, the legal coverage of the UB program has been extended 
from the firms with thirty or more workers in 1995 to the firms with one or more workers in 1998.4 
Second, the eligibility criteria for UB have been changed in terms of the minimum insured period, the 
validity of the reason for job separation, and registering for job search. Third, the prescribed periods 
of UB have been increased.  
 
                                                                
4 But, daily workers were not covered at this point of time. The legal coverage of the UB was extended 
to daily workers in 2004. 
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Figure 5.9 Trends in the proportion of UB recipients to the unemployed. 
Note. Number of UB recipients is average of UB recipients in each month in a particular year 
Source: KEIS, Employment Insurance Annual Report; Korea National Statistical Office, Economically Active 
Population Survey (from Hwang, 2012) 
 
The proportion of UB recipients in [Figure 5.10] is simply a ratio of the number of unemployment 
benefits recipients to the number of unemployed and it is relatively overstated when compared with 
that of major European countries which is based on survey. A large proportion people separated 
from jobs move out of the labor market rather than staying in as unemployed workers, which make 
the denominator small in calculating the proportion of UB recipients to the unemployed. Lee(2011) 
provides improved estimates using supplementary information from the Economically Active 
Population Survey. [Table 5.9] shows that only 11.3% of unemployed wage workers separated within 
1 year of survey date are receiving benefits as of August 2009. The gap in the proportion among 
employment status is quite large. The factors that caused the low rate of benefit receipt can be 
summarized as follows: First, many workers, particularly irregular workers, are not covered by the UB; 
Second, strict eligibility criteria deprives benefits from most voluntary workers; Third, a substantial 
proportion of unemployed workers do not satisfy the contribution criteria because their employment 
status is unstable (Hwang 2012). 
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Table 5.10 Distribution of reasons of not receiving UB by employment status. Unit (%) 
 
not receiving benefits 
receiving 
benefits 
 
not 
insured 
no 
sufficient 
contribution 
cause of  
seperation 
others 
exhaustion 
of  
benefits 
Total 45.0 11.1 22.9 6.8 2.9 11.3 
Permanent 9.0 5.7 34.2 7.6 6.6 37.0 
temporary 46.9 11.6 25.1 6.5 2.7 7.2 
Daily 61.6 13.5 14.9 6.6 1.1 2.3 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey (Supplementary Survey, 2009. 
April). Cited from Lee(2011) 
 
The actual daily amount of job-seeking benefits would be set at less than 50 % since it is bound by 
upper and lower limits. According to [Figure 5.11], the earnings replacement rate, the ratio of the 
average monthly job-seeking benefits to the average total earnings, declined steadily from more than 
51.9% in 1997 to a mere 32.3% in 2004. Regular workers in relatively large firms were included to the 
UB coverage at the initial stage of the institution but a great number of workers with relatively 
poorer working conditions entered the UB with the expansion of the coverage in 1998. This explains 
the decline of earning replacement rates from 1998 to 2000. Average duration of the unemployment 
benefits is about 120 days since the mid-2000's, although the maximum duration is defined up to 240 
days. This is mostly because Korean workers’ tenure is much shorter than in other developed 
counties. Considering eligibility criteria, duration of benefits, and the replacement rates, Korean UB 
shows relatively low generosity compared to other OECD countries(Hwang, 2011).  
 
Figure 5.10 Trends in monthly benefit amount and replacement rate. 
Source: KEIS, Employment Insurance Annual Report (from Hwang, 2012) 
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Note: The Blue line is broken between 2004 and 2005 because the Korea Employment Information Service 
provides a different estimate of average monthly job-seeking benefits, which resulted in a slight increase in the 
indicator from 2005.  
 
5.4.3 Coverage of Social Insurance 
For the past several decades, Korea has established a social insurance system including public 
pension, health insurance, unemployment benefits, and industrial accident insurance. The proportion 
of social insurance payments in the total social expenditures is huge. Therefore, incomplete coverage 
of social insurance holds great meaning as to the effectiveness of redistribution policies and 
disposable income inequality. Who exactly do the social insurance schemes protect? 
In particular, national pension and employment insurance serve the function of providing income 
security, but these two schemes have extremely large blind spots. Jong-gun Kim(2007) warns that, 
“The very large blind spots in Korea’s social insurance schemes erode the foundation of Korea’s social 
security and threaten to turn welfare schemes into new mechanisms that deepen inequality.” This 
implies that greater welfare expenditures will end up exacerbating polarization if the expenditures 
are used in a manner that excludes the lowest income groups. This danger is rooted in the fact that 
Korea’s social insurance schemes exist within a dual labor market.  
First, let us consider the self-employed. Among all employed persons, wage workers account for 
about 70% while the remaining 30% consist of employers, the self-employed, unpaid family workers 
and other non-wage workers. Social insurance contributions for wage workers (who subscribe 
through the workplace) are split equally between the employers and the workers, whereas non-wage 
workers (region-based subscribers) must shoulder all contributions by themselves, leading to a low 
rate of subscription for self-employed persons and owners of very small businesses. The 2009 
Supplementary Survey on Non-wage Workers conducted as part of the Economically Active 
Population Survey asked about national pension subscription and found that 21.8% of employers and 
44.3% of business owners with no employees did not subscribe to the national pension(Table 5.10). 
We can surmise that there is a very high possibility that owners of very small businesses remain 
beyond the protective reach of the safety net that is provided through social insurance.  
 
Table 5.11 Subscription to and receipt of national pension by non-wage workers. 
 
Employers 
Self-employed small 
business owners 
Total 
Workplace-based subscribers 40.3  6.7  15.4  
Region-based subscribers 33.2  34.7  34.3  
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Employers 
Self-employed small 
business owners 
Total 
Recipients(eligible persons)  4.8  14.3  11.9  
Non-subscribers 21.8  44.3  38.4  
Total (1,000 persons, %) 
1493.7 
(25.9%) 
4265.9 
(74.1%) 
5759.6  
Source: Korea National Statistical Office. , Economically Active Population Survey Supplementary Survey, 
August 2009  
 
Wage workers, too, sometimes remain in blind spots and are not protected by the social safety net. 
[Table 5.11] categorizes wage workers by gender, firm size, wage level and employment type, and 
looks at employment insurance subscription for each group. In terms of health insurance, all wage 
workers should be workplace-based subscribers by law, but we discover that many wage workers are 
in fact region-based subscribers or are enrolled for health insurance as a dependent of another 
family member. Although this does imply that the law is not being fully complied with, since these 
wage workers are being still protected by health insurance – albeit in a manner different from that 
provided for by law – and are therefore not neglected by the social safety net, this part of the study 
does not focus on health insurance coverage. As for employment insurance, we note that civil 
servants and extraordinary postal service workers are not eligible for employment insurance but are 
covered by a different protective mechanism. Meanwhile, those excluded by law from employment 
insurance coverage include atypical workers who engage in part-time work or are independent 
contractors, who work under extremely unstable and poor conditions. Therefore, problems that arise 
due to the lack of employment insurance coverage will mostly arise with the ‘excluded’ and 
‘unsubscribed’ among the groups in [Table 5.11].  
Among all wage workers, 27.1% do not subscribe to the national pension, while for employment 
insurance, the excluded and the unsubscribed account for 33.4% of all wage workers. Utilizing our 
previous definitions for the primary and the secondary labor markets, we see that a very insignificant 
1.4% and 3.2% of workers in the primary labor market (regular workers in firms with at least 100 
persons) are not covered by national pension and employment insurance, while among workers in 
the secondary labor market, 32.6% do not subscribe to the national pension and 39.8% (including the 
‘excluded’ group) do not subscribe to employment insurance. This tells us that social insurance is not 
doing very much in terms of providing an employment safety net in the secondary labor market 
which already suffers from unstable employment and lower wages. This, in turn, implies that it is 
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extremely difficult for social insurance schemes to achieve their original goal of providing protection 
against social risks, namely, the loss of income.  
This same issue appears in a similar manner in terms of the social insurance subscription rates by 
wage level, firm size and employment type. Lower-wage groups will require more help from the 
social safety net provided by state welfare when they experience an interruption to their wage 
income, but the reality is that these groups are not able to subscribe to the social insurance schemes. 
Of the low-wage workers who earn less than 2/3 of the median wage, 60% are not covered by the 
national pension and 66.2% are not protected by employment insurance.  
Workers in micro businesses and irregular workers have very unstable employment. As described in 
the previous section, these groups are constantly exposed to the threat of unemployment and 
therefore most urgently need protection through the employment safety net. In reality, however, 
these groups are neglected beyond the scope of protection provided by employment insurance. 
Among workers in workplaces with less than 5 workers, 61% are not covered by the national pension, 
while an alarming 73.9% are not covered by employment insurance. Irregular workers also suffer 
from a similar situation. 48% of irregular workers lack national pension coverage, while 56.8% are not 
covered by employment insurance.  
  
Table 5.12 Wage worker social insurance subscription rates. 
(Unit: %) 
All 
National pension 
(+Special 
occupational 
pension) 
Health insurance Employment insurance  
 
U WB CB U WB CB MA WBD CS S Ex U 
Wage workers 27.1  65.6  7.3  2.4  67.6  17.6  1.0  11.4  7.7  58.9  8.6  24.8  
Wage group 
Low-wage 60.0  30.0  10.0  5.6  35.0  31.2  2.8  25.4  0.3  33.6  16.4  49.8  
Mid-wage 22.0  69.7  8.3  1.8  70.7  18.0  0.5  8.9  3.4  67.2  6.8  22.6  
High-wage 4.4  92.6  3.0  0.3  93.2  4.4  0.0  2.1  21.5  69.5  4.0  5.1  
Firm size 
1-4 61.0  25.6  13.4  5.3  27.1  39.0  2.4  26.2  0.4  25.7  16.1  57.8  
5-9 38.4  51.1  10.6  3.8  54.1  25.9  1.1  15.1  0.9  51.8  6.1  41.2  
10-29 23.5  69.5  7.0  2.1  72.3  15.0  1.0  9.5  4.7  67.3  9.4  18.7  
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30-99 13.4  81.5  5.1  1.0  83.6  9.1  0.5  5.9  14.6  68.1  8.8  8.5  
100-299 6.2  91.8  2.0  0.6  92.5  4.0  0.1  2.8  12.0  79.6  3.4  5.1  
300- 3.6  95.4  1.0  0.1  95.9  2.1  0.1  1.8  19.8  74.5  2.0  3.8  
Employment 
type 
Regular 16.8  78.6  4.6  1.7  79.6  11.8  0.5  6.4  10.9  67.2  1.5  20.4  
Irregular 48.0  39.3  12.7  3.8  43.3  29.6  1.9  21.4  1.3  42.1  22.8  33.9  
Contingent 31.7  60.9  7.4  3.0  66.9  16.3  1.5  12.3  2.1  63.8  12.3  21.9  
Part-time 81.4  8.4  10.2  6.2  9.6  36.7  3.4  44.1  0.7  10.0  37.6  51.7  
Atypical 57.8  21.4  20.8  3.6  28.0  42.7  2.3  23.2  0.1  28.1  36.8  35.1  
Note1: U = unsubscribed, WB = workplace-based, CB = community-based, MA = medical aid, WBD = workplace 
subscriber dependent, CS = civil servants and others, Ex= legally excluded, S = subscribed.  
Note2: For wage groups, ‘low-wage’ is less than 2/3 of the median value for hourly wage, ‘high-wage’ is at least 
3/2 of the median value, and ‘mid-wage’ is in between 2/3 and 3/2. 
Note3: Irregular=contingent, part-time & atypical; Contingent=fixed-term & repeat contractual; 
Atypical=dispatched, agency, independent contractor, home-based and daily workers  
Data: National Statistics Korea, Economically Active Population Survey march 2010 (Supplementary survey on 
Employment Type) 
 
5.4.4 Remarks on Redistributive Effects of Tax and Social Expenditure 
The redistribution effect of taxes and social expenditure in Korea is known to be insignificant. GINI 
coefficients of market income and those of disposable income for Korea were 0.368 and 0.311, 
respectively, in 2006. After adding publically transferred income to HH market income and 
subtracting tax and social security contribution, the GINI coefficient is reduced only of 15% in Korea, 
while the reduction as a percentage is 40% or more in all the Nordic and western European countries. 
Southern European countries and English speaking countries tends to show lower percentage 
reductions, but is still much greater than Korea.  
Three reasons for the less effective redistribution policies can be identified from the observations 
described before. First, the volume of social expenditure itself as a percentage of GDP is still 
insufficient, although it has increased during the recent several decades. Second, public income 
transfer non-proportionally depends on the social insurance system, which has lack of coverage so 
far. The low income population is less likely to be covered by social insurance as well. Third, the 
public pension scheme has not yet matured, although it is progressively designed. Ineffectiveness of 
the public pension in protecting the elderly results in a very high rate of poverty in elderly 
population(45%).  
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However, there is some evidence of the improvement of policy effectiveness as well. The 
decomposition of inequality change in the recent 15 years reveals that the public transfer and 
taxation worked positively to reduce the income inequality, although the policies were not enough to 
overcome the rapid growth of labor income inequality. According to [Table 2.6], public transfer 
contributed to reduce the income gap between the highest and lowest income groups as much as 
18%, and tax and social security payment contributed to a 48% reduction of inequality, while 
employment income is responsible for 122% of the inequality increase during the period between 
1996 and 2011.  
It is worth mentioning that the 1999 public assistance reform improved the policy effectiveness to 
reduce poverty. The National Basic Livelihood Security System (NBLSS) was implemented in 2000, 
and under this system, cash and in-kind benefits are provided to the poor to guarantee a minimum 
standard of living, regardless of their ability to work. The benefit per person also increased about 
threefold following the NBLSS reform. The effectiveness of public assistance can be measured by how 
much the policy decreases the poverty ratio rather than the income inequality in general. The 
difference between poverty ratios based on market income and on current income were 0.09%p in 
1996 and the figure increased to 1.30%p in 2006.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
As labour income is the major reason behind the increasing income inequality, labor market policies 
are very important to contain worsening inequality in Korea. Particularly in the midst of the wide-
spread low-wage sector, the minimum wage policy is a very powerful means to combat inequality. 
The Minimum Wage Act was enacted in 1987, and entered into force in 1988. The increasing rate of 
minimum wage began to catch up with the average wage growth rate, and the influencing rate 
(Number of beneficiaries/Number of applied employee*100) started to increase only after the crisis 
and the change of political power in 1998. 
It is known that the minimum wage has not been successful in raising the relative wage level of low-
wage workers. This is because minimum-wage regulations are not strictly enforced and complied 
with. The share of workers earning below minimum wage has been increasing from 2000 to 2009. 
Even at the moment, a considerable number of workers(around 2 million) are below the minimum 
wage.  
Even though it is argued that minimum wage is not effective in reducing household income inequality 
because the minimum wage could result in assisting low-wage workers in high income households, 
the distributional effect of minimum wage is greater than that of EITC, which was introduced in 2008 
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to purportedly protect low-income families. Considering the supply of low-skilled labor increases in 
labor market as a result of EITC, MW would be a more effective way of supporting the low-income 
families by preventing wage reduction of low-skilled workers. 
Already existing socioeconomic inequalities are reproduced by weak unionization for the 
disadvantaged and the prevalence of company-level industrial relations limiting collective bargaining 
coverage. The company union system of Korea does not contribute to reducing wage inequality. This 
means that improvement of inequality will be partly dependent on changes in Korea’s industrial 
relation system. 
The redistribution effect of tax and social expenditure in Korea is known to be insignificant. GINI 
coefficients of market income and of disposable income for Korea were 0.368 and 0.311, respectively, 
in 2006. After adding publically transferred income to HH market income and subtracting tax and 
social security contribution, GINI coefficient is reduced by only 15% in Korea.  
Three reasons for the less effective redistribution policies are identified from the observations in this 
chapter. First, the amount of social expenditure itself as a percentage of GDP is still insufficient, 
although it has increased during the recent several decades. Second, public income transfer non-
proportionally depends on social insurance system, which has lack of coverage so far. Low income 
populations are less likely to be covered by social insurance as well. Third, the public pension scheme 
is not matured enough, although it is progressively designed. Ineffectiveness of public pension to 
protect the elderly results in very high rates of poverty in the elderly population.  
However, there is some evidence for the improvement of policy effectiveness as well. The 
decomposition of inequality change over the recent 15 years reveals that the public transfer and 
taxation worked positively to reduce income inequality, although the policies were not enough to 
overcome the rapid growth of labor income inequality.  
The National Basic Livelihood Security System (NBLSS), implemented in 2000, was effective in 
reducing poverty. With the public assistance reform, cash and in-kind benefits are provided to the 
poor to guarantee a minimum level of living, regardless of their ability to work. The difference 
between poverty rates based in market income and in current income were 0.09%p in 1996 and the 
figure increased to 1.30%p in 2006. 
  
GINI Country Report Korea 
Page 106 
 
References  
Ahn, Sanghoon, KyojiFukao and Keiko Ito, 2007, “Outsourcing in East Asia and Its Impact on the 
Japanese and Korean Labor Markets,” OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 65. 
Chang, Jiyeun (2012) ‘Level of Inequality According to Various Strata of Income Definition and 
Constituting Factors’ Trends and Outlooks vol. 85. Society for Social Sciences Studies/Park 
Youngryul Publishing Company (in Korean). 
Chang, Jiyeun (2012) ‘Level of Inequality According to Various Strata of Income Definition and 
Constituting Factors’ Trends and Outlooks vol. 85. Society for Social Sciences Studies/Park 
Youngryul Publishing Company(in Korean). 
Chang, Jiyeun& Shin, Donggyun. 2010. Income bi-polarization and suicide. Korean Studies of Social 
Security, 26(2), (in Korean). 
Chen, Wen-Hao (2009), "Cross-national Differences in Income Mobility: Evidence from Canada, the 
United States, Great Britain and Germany," Review of Income and Wealth, Vol. 55, Issue 1. (in 
Korean). 
Eun, Ki-Soo, 2005, Socioeconomic determinants of suicide rate in Korea, Korean Studies of Population, 
28(2), 97-129. 
Förster, M.(2000), "Trends and driving factors in income inequality and poverty in the OECD area", 
OECD Labour Market and Social Policy Occational Papers No.42.  
Hong, Kyung Zoon., 2004. Analyzing the Length of Poverty Spells, Korean Journal of Social Welfare 
Studies, 24, Spring, 187-210.(in Korean) 
Hwang, Duksoon (2012, forthcoming) “Employment Insurance and Unemployment Benefit in Korea” 
in Unemployment Insurance in Asia Korea Labor Insurance(in Korean). 
Jang, Soo-Myung& Han, Chirok. 2011. "Education policy and class mobility." Yeo, Eugene, Jang, 
SooMyung, Kim, Moon Kil& Han, Chirok.Changing Society and Social Mobility. Seoul: Korea 
Institute for Health and Social Affairs. (in Korean) 
Jeong, J.-H 2011, “The Wage-Distribution Effect of the Minimum Wage“, Korea Labor Institute. (in 
English). 
Ji, Eun-Jeong, 2011, Inequality Factors and Trend in the Earnings of Self-Employed, Korean Journal of 
Social Welfare, Vol. 64, No. 2, 2012. 5, pp. 55-83. (in Korean) 
Jeong, Jin-Ho, 2011, The Wage-Distribution Effect of the Minimum Wage, Korea Labor Institute. (in 
Korean). 
Lee, Byunghee and Jung, Jaeho, 2002, An Analysis of Poverty Structure- Repeat Poverty and its 
relation to Employment, Trends and Prospects, 52, 128-150.(in Korean) 
Lee, Joung-Woo, and Seonglim Lee, 2001. “Current Trends of Household Wealth Inequality in South 
Korea,” in Journal of Labor Policy 1: 39-51. (in Korean) 
GINI Country Report Korea 
 
Page 107 
Lee, Sang Rok, 2011, Material Hardship of the poor families in Korea, Korean Journal of Social 
Welfare Studies, 42(3), 233-265(in Korean) 
Jung, Ki Won, 2004, Socioeconomic Conditions and Divorce Rate in Korea: An Analysis of Time-series 
Data, 1970-2002, Korean Population, 7(1),57-80(in Korean). 
Jung, Chang-Mu, 2008, Exploring the relationship Between divorce rate and socio-economic factors 
in Korea, National Land Planning, 43(3), 81-90. (in Korean). 
Kang, Byung-Goo, and Sung, Hyo-Yong, 2009, “A comparison of Distribution Effects of EITC and 
National Minimum Wage in Korea”, Korean Journal of Fiscal Policy, 11(3): 215-234. (in Korean).  
Kang, Shin-Wook, Lee, Byung-Hee, Jang, Soomyung & Kim, Min-Hee. 2010. Improving social mobility 
through linkage of employment, welfare and education policy. Presidential Committee on 
Social Cohesion. (in Korean) 
Kim, Hak-Ju, 2005. “Anlysis of Household Debt Burden by Income Classes.” in Journal of Social 
Security Studies 21(1): 119-147. (in Korean) 
Kim, YoungMi and Shin, KwangYoung, 2008, 'Labour Market Dualizaiton of Marriage Female and 
Changes in Household Income Inequality, Economy and Society, 77, 79-106. . (in Korean) 
Kim, Woo Young, 2008, “Changes in Employment Structure and Educational Wage Inequality”, 
Analysis of Korean Economy, No. 344. Institute of Finance and Economy, Bank of Korea. . (in 
Korean) 
Kim, Kyo-seong& Noh, Hye-jin. 2009. "An empirical study of poverty exit and duration: life table 
analysis and hierarchical generalized linear analysis." in Social Welfare Policy 36(3): 185-212. 
(in Korean) 
Kim, Kyung-Hwan, and Bertrand Renaud, 2009. “The Global House Price Boom and its Unwinding: An 
Analysis and a Commentary.” in Housing Studies 24(1): 7-24. (in Korean). 
Kim, Jin-Wook, 2010, "Poverty and income transfer of lone-parent households: comparing with two-
parent households." in Social Welfare Policy 37(1): 101-125. (in Korean).  
Kim, Soon Young. 2011. Loan Offering Society. Humanitas. (Korean) 
Kim, You Seon, 2012, “Analysis of labour income using tax data from National Tax Service”, Korean 
Labour and Society Institute, Issue Paper No.3.(in Korean).  
Lee, Sang-Eun. 2008. "Intergenerational transmission of poverty in Korea." in Korean Journal of Social 
Welfare 60(2): 53-76. (in Korean) 
Maxwell, N. L. (1990). Changing Female Labor Force Participation: Influences on Income Inequality 
and Distribution.Social Forces.68(4).1251-1266.  
Moon, Sook-Jae, Soon HeeJoung, and Yoon Kyung Yuh, 2002. “Determinants of Household’s Net 
Worth Level.” in Journal of Consumer Studies 13(3): 169-188. (in Korean) 
Nahm, PyeongTak., 2010a. The Effect of Global Outsourcing on Wage Inequality in Manufacturing, 
The Korean Economic Review, 58(4), Korea Economics Association. (in Korean).  
Nahm, PyeongTak, 2010b, “International Trade and Wage Inequality in Korea,” Journal of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3, Korea Economics and Business Association. (in Korean). 
GINI Country Report Korea 
Page 108 
Nam, J.R. 2011, “The Income-Distribution Effect of the Minimum Wage“, in Jeong(eds) Analysing 
Effects of Minimum Wage, Korea Labor Institute. (in Korean). 
Nam, Sang-Seob, 2009. “Decomposition of Inequality and Distribution of Household Wealth in Korea.” 
in Journal of Economic Studies 27(2): 59-86. (in Korean) 
No, Dae-Myung. 2011. Study on Welfare Attitudes in Korea: Policy Implications for Social Cohesion. 
Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs. (in Korean). 
Ok, Wooseok, SeeunJeong and Yonghyup Oh, 2007, “Trade, International Division of Labor, Skill-
Demand Structure and Wage Inequalities: With a Focus on the Korea-China Trade,” The 
Analyses of Korea’s Economy, Vol. 13, No. 3. (in Korean).  
OECD, 2006, Addressing Labor Market Duality in Korea. 
OECD. 2004. OECD Employment Outlook 2004. 
Park, MyungHo, 2012, "International Comparison of Characteristics of Top-Income Earners', Tax and 
Finance Brife, Korea Institute of Public Finance. (in Korean).  
Park, Sunghoon., Anshik Jang., and Lee, Jaekyung., 2009, Social Changes and Crimes rates in Korea 
1966-2007, Social Studies, 18(2), 45-72. (in Korean).  
Seong, J.M., 2010. "Wage Inequality in korea: Comparison with the U.S." in Korean Journal of Labor 
Studies 16(1): 61-101. (in Korean).  
Shin, Jin-Wook, 2011a. “Globalization and Increasing Inequality in East Asia: The Case of Japan and 
South Korea.” in Nikolai Genov (ed.), Global Trend and Regional Developments, London: 
Routledge, pp. 208-225. (in Korean). 
Shin, Jin-Wook,, 2011b. “The Uniqueness of Korean Residential Capitalism in International 
Comparison,” in Journal of Korean Social Trends and Perspectives 81: 112-155. (in Korean) 
Shin, Young Jeon, 2009, Health promotion strategies and programmes development for health 
inequalities alleviation, Research Paper prepared by Hanyang University. (in Korean). 
Yang, Jaejin (2012) “The Origin of Low Tax Rate and Tax Boost Politics in Korean Welfare State” 
presented paper in Joint Conference of Korean Social Policy 2012. Hansin University. (in Korean) 
  
GINI Country Report Korea 
 
Page 109 
 
Appendix  
Appendix Table 1 Decomposition of Income Inequality: Gap between the highest and the lowest 
income groups (Working Age HH's) - extended version of Table 2.6 
 
estimates contribution 
(1)  0.1743  1.0000  
(2)  0.1941  1.1133  
(3)  0.0476  0.2728  
(4)  -0.0367  -0.2106  
(5)  0.0193  0.1108  
(6)  0.0025  0.0144  
(7)  0.0131  0.0753  
(8)  0.1223  0.7013  
(9)  -0.0102  -0.0585  
(10)  0.0515  0.2952  
(11)  -0.0266  -0.1527  
(12)  -0.1219  -0.6992  
(13)  0.0682  0.3913  
(14)  -0.0037  -0.0210  
(15)  -0.0310  -0.1780  
(16)  0.0283  0.1621  
(17)  -0.0845  -0.4846  
(18)  -0.0700  -0.4018  
(19)  0.0122  0.0699  
notes : other family member's labor income, capital income, private transfer income, public 
transfer income, tax and social security contribution. 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, HES 1996, NSHIE 2011. 
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Appendix Table 2 Social expenditure by program including mandatory private expenditure. 
1990 Cash in-kind Total 
OLD AGE 24.91  0.89  25.80  
SURVIVORS 4.87  0.18  5.04  
INCAPACITY 11.09  0.84  11.93  
HEALTH  - 49.69  49.69  
FAMILY  0.04  0.98  1.01  
ALMP  - 0.86  0.86  
UNEMPLOYMENT  - -  -  
OTHER  4.82  0.85  5.67  
Total 45.72  54.28  100.00  
 
2000 Cash in-kind Total 
OLD AGE 32.40  0.67  33.07  
SURVIVORS 2.97  0.14  3.11  
INCAPACITY 6.55  2.10  8.66  
HEALTH  - 39.36  39.36  
FAMILY  0.69  1.94  2.63  
ALMP  - 6.92  6.92  
UNEMPLOYMENT 1.41   - 1.41  
OTHER  4.67  0.18  4.85  
Total 48.69  51.31  100.00  
 
Total 48.69  51.31  100.00  
2007 Cash in-kind Total 
OLD AGE 22.25  2.55  24.81  
SURVIVORS 3.05  0.06  3.11  
INCAPACITY 6.20  2.08  8.28  
HEALTH -  42.90  42.90  
FAMILY  0.82  5.87  6.69  
ALMP -  1.59  1.59  
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Total 48.69  51.31  100.00  
UNEMPLOYMENT 3.06  -  3.06  
OTHER  1.56  7.99  9.55  
Total 36.95  63.05  100.00  
Source: OECD Social Expenditure DB. 
 
 
Appendix Table 3 Log-Table Korea 
  1981-
1987 
1988-
1993 
1993-
1997 
1997-
2003 
2003-
2008 
2008-
2011 
Figure in 
Report 
Chapter 1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Share of Employment of Manufacturing ↗ ↘ ↘ → ↘ → Figure 1.1 
Ratio of Foreign Trade to GDP ↘ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗ → Figure 1.1 
Population Growth Rate → → → ↘ ↘ → Figure 1.3 
Total Fertility Rate → → ↘ ↘ ↗ ↘ Figure 1.3 
Employment Rate ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘↗ → → Figure 1.4 
Unemployment Rate ↘ ↘ ↘ ↗↘ → → Figure 1.4 
Ratio of Wage Earners to Total 
Employees 
↗ ↗ → ↗ ↗ ↗ Figure 1.5 
Labour' Share → ↗ ↗ ↘ → → Figure 1.5 
Chapter 2 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
GINI(household market income) → ↘ → ↗ ↗ → Figure 2.2 
GINI(household disposable income) → ↘ → ↗ ↗ → Figure 2.2 
Share of Lowest 20% n.a. n.a. ↘ ↘ ↘ → Figure 2.3 
Share of top 20% n.a. n.a. → ↗ ↗ → Figure 2.3 
Absolute Poverty Rate n.a. n.a. ↘ ↗↘ → → Figure 2.5 
Relative Poverty Rate n.a. n.a. → ↗↘ ↗ → Figure 2.5 
Wealth Inequality n.a. n.a. ↘ ↗ → → Figure 2.6 
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Wage Inequality ↘ ↘ → ↗ ↗ → Figure 2.8 
(P90/P10) of Wage ↘ ↘ → ↗ ↗ → Figure 2.8 
(P90/P50) of Wage ↘ ↘ → ↗ ↗ → Figure 2.8 
(P50/P10) of Wage ↘ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ → Figure 2.8 
Wage Premium for College ↘ ↘ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘ 
Figure 
2.11 
Number of College Graduate ↗ → ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘ 
Figure 
2.19 
Wage Premium for Lagre Establishments → ↗↘ ↗ → ↗ ↘ 
Figure 
2.11 
Share of Export to the US ↗ ↘ ↘ ↗↘ ↘ ↘ 
Figure 
2.12 
Share of Export to China n.a. n.a. ↗ ↗ ↗ → 
Figure 
2.12 
Gini of Educational Years n.a. n.a. ↘ ↘ ↘ ↘ 
Figure 
2.18 
Inequality of Education Expenditure n.a. ↘ → ↗ ↗ ↗ 
Figure 
2.20 
Chapter 3 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Income Mobility: Maintaining Income 
Status 
n.a. n.a. → → ↗ 
 
Figure 3.2 
Income Mobility: Maintaining Poverty 
Status 
n.a. n.a. ↗ → ↗ 
 
Figure 3.2 
Divorce Rate by Economic Problems   → ↗ ↗ → ↘ Figure 3.5 
Marriage Rate n.a. n.a. → ↘ ↗↘ → Figure 3.9 
Inequality in Self-Reported Health Status n.a. n.a.   → → → 
Figure 
3.10 
Crime for a living n.a. n.a. → ↗ ↗ → 
Figure 
3.14 
Suicide Rate n.a. n.a. → ↗ ↗ → 
Figure 
3.14 
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Chapter 4 
  
  
  
Vote Turnout Rate n.a. ↗ ↘ ↘ ↘ → Figure 4.1 
Participation rate in community activities  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. ↘ ↗ Figure 4.5 
Political Orientation towards liberal n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. → ↗ 
Figure 
4.12 
Agreeing inequalities are problematic  ↗ ↗ → → → n.a. 
Figure 
4.15 
Chapter 5 
  
  
  
  
  
Minimum Wage Growth Rate n.a. n.a. ↘ ↗↘ → ↘ Figure 5.1 
Share of Workers earning below 
minimum wage 
n.a. n.a. ↗ ↗ ↗ → Figure 5.2 
Ratio of Income Tax to GDP n.a. ↘ → ↗ → → Figure 5.5 
Social Security Contribution n.a. ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ → Figure 5.5 
Proportion of UB recipients to the 
unemployed 
n.a. n.a. n.a. ↗ ↗ → 
Figure 
5.10 
Replacement Rate of UB n.a. n.a. n.a. ↘ → → 
Figure 
5.11 
 
